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Introduction:
Constitutions must change. No human can stop time from marching forward, nor the 
social, economic, cultural, and technological developments associated. As a result, constitutions 
necessitate mechanisms that allow for their own progress. The amendment procedure of a 
constitution—the rules that govern what changes can occur—is therefore fundamental to any 
constitutional system. Importantly, scholars, politicians, and citizens alike fail to take into 
account the significance of these amendment processes and their effects on the constitutions they 
govern. While usually treated as a constitutional after-thought, amendment procedures have one 
of the most pronounced, substantive effects on the permanence of a constitutional 
order. Amendment procedures not only create the environment in which amendments are passed, 
but they also inform whether or not constitutional change occurs outside the formal amendment 
process—via things like judicial reinterpretation. As a result, amendment procedures have a 
relationship with the constitutional stability of a nation—the extent to which the constitution’s 
principles and institutions are followed. It is the goal of this thesis to highlight this relationship, 
and reveal the effects amendment processes have on their constitutions. 
This thesis posits a procedure-based theory—that amendments are introduced and passed 
as a result of their amendment process, and when analyzing constitutional developments, it is 
first fundamental to analyze that nation’s amendment process. Amendment processes are critical 
to constitutional stability, and should be crafted to promote this end. To elucidate this claim, this 
thesis challenges the arguments of many of America’s foremost legal scholars and their 
understanding of amendatory change in America. The modern scholarly consensus often views 
amendatory change in a vacuum, failing to take into account the ways in which amendment 
procedure influence amendment. While this at first appears like an intuitive, obvious conclusion, 
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amendment procedures are rarely discussed in this context. As a result, this thesis hopes to bring 
procedure to the forefront of the amendatory debate. 
To do achieve this end, the first chapter of this thesis focuses on the modern scholarly 
arguments around the concept of amendment to show how formal amendment—rather than other 
informal means—is the best way to change a constitution in pursuit of the goal of constitutional 
stability. With this claim cemented, Chapter 2 focuses on the benefits of making certain 
constitutional unamendable, and this unamendability’s effects on constitutional stability more 
generally. Chapter 3 turns our attention to specific amendment processes and their effects, using 
Eastern Europe as a unique case study to elucidate the relationship between amendment 
processes and constitutional stability. The analysis found in Chapter 3 informs this thesis’ theory 
of amendatory change, which posits that amendment procedure effects constitutional stability via 
four main factors—the institutions involved, the level of difficulty, unamendability, and 
amendment culture. This theory is then applied to America’s constitution and history to highlight 
Article V’s effects on America today. 
This structured analysis elucidates the importance of amendment, its relationship to 
amendment procedure, and this process’ effects on constitutional stability. By bringing 
amendment procedure back into the constitutional discussion, this thesis hopes to reveal how this 
important piece of the constitutional puzzle has been wrongly discounted and ignored. When 
scholars try to analyze the causes of a country’s constitutional stability, they must first 
understand that nation’s amendment procedure and its effects. 
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Chapter 1: Amendments and Their Effects
Before turning our attention to amendment processes, it is first important to establish the 
assumptions this thesis uses in its analysis. Namely, that formal amendment is the best avenue 
for constitutional change, and that amendment processes inform what amendments occur. The 
first section of this chapter focuses on the original normative justifications behind amendment 
procedures in America, and why the Founding Fathers felt it fundamental to include Article V. 
Subsequently, this chapter turns to a discussion of amendatory change more generally, explaining 
the arguments of those who oppose amendatory change in pursuit of constitutional stability. 
Many scholars contend that formal amendments ‘trivialize’ the constitution, or undermine its 
stability, but these claims are erroneous when the benefits of formal amendment are properly 
understood. To complicate matters further, scholars like Bruce Ackerman and Sanford Levinson 
contend that formal amendment is ‘superfluous’ and constitutional change regularly happens 
outside the amendment procedure in America. However, this paper views this informal 
amendatory change as problematic, as it actually undermines constitutional stability rather than 
reinforces it. This chapter concludes that formal amendment is the best avenue for constitutional 
change if the end is constitutional stability. In turn, amendment processes influence formal 
amendment, and have a pronounced effect on constitutional stability. 
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Section 1: The Original Justifications
The process of amendatory change is older than the American Constitution. The original 
normative justifications for formal amendments are the same as those used today. To understand 
amendments and their effects on a constitutional system, it is first important to understand their 
original justifications as well as modern empirical and theoretical arguments about them. 
Through a presentation of historical evidence and contemporary legal theory, a comprehensive 
picture of amendment will be painted. 
The concept of amendment procedure was first developed in English speaking North 
America and was grounded in the idea of popular sovereignty.  In essence, advocates for 1
amendment processes contended that if a constitution depends on the consent of the governed, 
those who are governed must be able to change that document. The first of these mechanisms 
was found in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution, which allowed for a convention process 
through which the constitution could be changed, bypassing the legislature.  Interestingly, 2
Pennsylvania’s amendment clause specified that this convention would be held every seven 
years, requiring a supermajority of public support to be ratified.  When creating processes of this 3
sort, the Founding Fathers had three main normative justifications. Primarily, the Framers of 
America’s constitution understood that humans are imperfect and learn with time. The Framers 
viewed the new American state as an experiment, and it was necessary for “provision[s] to be 
made for altering institutions after experience revealed their flaws and unintended 
 Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 1
(1994): pg. 355-370, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944709)
 Ibid.2
 Akhil Reed Amar, “Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment,” Responding to Imperfection, (1995): pg. 3
89-116, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821631.89)
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consequences.”  There were two pieces of this human fallibility argument—circumstances 4
change, and so the document must change with those circumstances, and people learn from 
experience, coming up with better mechanisms for effective governance. As Alexander Hamilton 
explained in Federalist #85, “to balance a large state … on general laws, is a work of [such] great 
difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive” can do this perfectly.  Consequently, 5
the Founding Fathers believed that “experience must guide [our constitutional understanding], 
time must bring it to perfection.”  6
The second justification for the amendment process is based on the importance of a 
deliberative process in the creation of cogent solutions. It was the understanding of America’s 
founders that the more deliberative a process was, the better the outcomes would be in balancing 
the interests of all.  As a result, the amendment procedure had to be onerous enough to ensure an 7
extremely majoritarian decision—the Founders did not want their document changed unless the 
reasoning behind it was incredibly strong.  Finally, the Founding Fathers wanted to cement their 8
constitution as a higher law.  By making the process by which the constitution changes more 9
arduous than regular lawmaking, the distinction between normal legislation and constitutional 
provisions is made clear.
Many legal scholars—as well as the Founding Fathers themselves—point to the 
amendment process portion of the Constitution, Article V as the “implementing [of] Jefferson’s 
   Akhil Reed Amar, (1995): pg 894
 Publius, “Federalist No. 85: Concluding Remarks,” The Federalist Papers5
 Ibid.6
 Donald S. Lutz, (1994): pg 3557
 Ibid.8
 Ibid.9
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formulation of consent by the governed.”  However, there is even debate as to what the 10
Framer’s truly understood the amendment process to amount to. The traditional view of Article V 
is that it is that it is a ‘government driven’ process. As Maryland’s Daniel Carroll explained at the 
Philadelphia Convention, their Constitution specifies the “mode” with which the document can 
be changed “[and] no other mode could pursued.”  However, James Madison disagreed with his 11
assertion, explaining how “the people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and … They could 
alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of Rights that first principles 
may be resorted to.”  12
For Madison, Maryland’s constitutional amendment procedure specified the way by which 
“ordinary government could amend the Constitution” but it did not restrict the people from doing 
so.  To justify his point, Madison contrasted the Maryland constitution with that of states like 13
Virginia, “where no mode of change was pointed out by the [state] constitution.”  Even without 14
a formal process, Madison believed the people of Virginia still had a legal right “to alter or 
abolish at will,” so in his view, the Maryland clause was just an enabling of government to 
amend the constitution, rather than giving them a monopoly over it.  As Framer James Wilson 15
explained, “Constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our 
constitution, [though] indeed the superiority… is much greater.”  16
 Akhil Reed Amar, (1995): pg 8910
 Ibid.11
 Ibid. pg 9012
 Ibid. pg 9113
 ibid.14
 Ibid.15
 Ibid.16
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In the 1780s, there was no need to specify the principle of majoritarian rule, it was a 
generally understood and respected principle. As Akhil Reed Amar argues in Popular 
Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, “it literally went without saying” that majority rule 
was the “clear corollary of [Jefferson’s understanding] of popular sovereignty.”  As a result, if 17
the only mechanism for constitutional change was Article V, it would, as Patrick Henry of 
Virginia put it, “clearly violate first principles.”  In this way, the Found Father’s believed that 18
nothing prevents “the People themselves … from exercising their legal right to alter or abolish 
government.”  As a result, whether through a formal process or something outside of it, 19
amendments are the means by which the people take control of their constitutional system. 
At this point, it is beneficial to define constitutional stability and its relationship with the 
original justifications behind Article V. This thesis take constitutional stability to mean the 
permanence of the constitutional system. For a constitution to endure, its underlying moral 
principles and the institutions it creates must be ‘respected’ by the populace. Initially, this would 
lead some to conclude that amendatory change is structurally in tension with constitutional 
stability. However, as has been expressed earlier, all constitutions must go through some upkeep 
as society changes dramatically with time. As a result, if the goal of a constitution is its 
permanence, it must also allow for its own change. This is what creates the relationship between 
amendments, amendment procedure, and constitutional stability. If a constitution never changes, 
its institutions and principles will be undermined as they become out-of-step with the times. 
Amendments are the changes that a populace believes their constitution needs, and the 
 Akhil Reed Amar, (1995): pg. 10017
 Ibid.18
 Ibid.19
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amendment procedure governs what amendments are proposed and ratified. As a result, 
amendments facilitate constitutional stability, changing the constitution in ways that promote its 
permanence.
It would have been impossible for the Founding Fathers to have foreseen the degree of 
constitutional change that would eventually occur in America. As a result, it is unsurprising that 
they tried to create a relatively arduous amendment process that would force deliberation and 
insulate the citizenry from undermining the hard-fought rights they had just been afforded. 
However, in doing so, the Framers of America’s Constitution created a constitutional system with 
unintended consequences. America has one of the least amended constitutions in the world due 
to its challenging amendment process. All of the modern literature on the topic of amendment 
and its effects is coloured by the American amendment procedure and the challenges it creates 
for citizens trying to use the formal process. As a result, American scholars apprehension about 
formal amendment, as well as their preference for the use of judiciary as the mechanism for 
constitutional change, is a direct consequence of the country’s amendment process, rather than a 
reflection of the inadequacies of formal amendment more generally. As a result, the subsequent 
section of this chapter takes up the arguments of modern legal literature on the topic, attempting 
to prove the importance of formal amendment and amendment procedures more generally. 
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Section 2: The Benefits of Formal Amendment
Consequently, there are a few assumptions that can be made about constitutions on the 
basis of these original amendment process justifications. The first is that every political system 
need to be changed at some point. The only constant in life is change—be it changes in a 
country’s economy, technology, and demographics, or a change in the populace’s values 
generally. As these changes occur, institutional problems arise as constitutional systems are 
rarely as forward-looking as citizens would like. When the constitution does not formally change 
via amendment, the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches usually step in to cumulatively 
change the constitutional system. The second assumption is that when constitutionally-bound 
political systems change, so too should the Constitution. As a result, all constitutions require 
periodic change through some process, and preferably, this process is the formal amendment one. 
Before justifying this claim, it is first pertinent to take up the arguments against formal 
amendment. 
There are many constitutional scholars who are sceptical as to the actual benefit of formal 
amendment. This is especially true in America, a country which has rarely turned to formal 
amendment, but also has the oldest constitution in use today. As a result, it is necessary to 
consider the normative arguments against amendments, as well as the criticisms against the 
formalism of the process. In her work, The (Myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and 
the democratic component of constitutionalism, Professor Vicki Jackson considers many of the 
arguments against formal amendment that are utilized by contemporary detractors.  A central 20
issue that the anti-amendment intelligentsia finds with formal amendment is that the addition of 
 Vicki C. Jackson, “The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of 20
constitutionalism,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July (2015): pg 579, https://
doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov050
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new text could “clutter or trivialize the Constitution”, undermining its “unifying force and 
symbolic significance.”  In America, there is a level of constitutional reverence matched by few 21
other nations. As a result, citizens and scholars who appreciate the rights and entitlements the 
Constitution already gives them fear that amendment undermine the overall spirit of the 
Constitution.  Constitutional veneration is a beneficial thing to democracy, as it results in a 22
citizenry respecting the underlying constitutional principles and system. 
With this in mind, it is understandable that scholars would want to protect this reverence by 
opposing formal amendment from a normative standpoint. In actuality, a proper amount of 
formal amendments increases, rather than diminishes, constitutional veneration. Obviously, if a 
constitution were amended too frequently, it could diminish this reverence in the way Jackson 
identified. However, rarely has this occurred in practice, and in countries across the world, 
amendments have promoted citizens’ support of their constitutional systems. Constitutional 
change is a necessity, and as a result, formal amendment allows the populace to involve 
themselves in constitutional matters. Through this deliberative process, citizens view their 
constitution more positively, as they played a role in crafting and consenting to the rules that 
govern them.  If all amendatory change happens through the judiciary or other informal means, 
citizens can come to view their constitution with contempt, as they have new constitutional 
regulations placed upon them that the citizenry never consented to. 
Another argument that Jackson takes up is the idea that, when people try to amend a 
constitution, it brings to the forefront “fundamental issues about [the] character” of the nation.  23
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 57921
 The idea of ‘the spirit of the Constitution’ will be brought back up later, when the questions of eternity clauses 22
and unamendability in the amendment process are taken up.
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 58123
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As a consequence, any serious attempt at formal amendment likely puts an incredibly divisive 
political question on the national agenda. Divisive political questions often hurt “national 
cohesion,” and even more integrally, “no country can … [argue] continuously” about the 
fundamental nature of their nation.  If there is constant disagreement as to what is integral to a 24
constitution, the whole point of a constitution—to have established rules and norms through 
which a society is governed—is undermined. As Madison stated in Federalist No. 43, too many 
amendments may “render [a] constitution … too mutable.”  25
Differently, many critics of amendments are law scholars who to some degree normatively 
support judicial supremacy in the constitutional scheme. These supremacists fear that 
amendments which overrule Supreme Court decisions could diminish the legitimacy of the 
Court. Judicial supremacists contend that for a democracy to function, there must be some 
‘settler of constitutional questions’, and the Court is the best institution to serve in this capacity. 
As a result, citizens must accept Court decisions, as constant disagreement in this regard 
undermines the rule of law, the role of the Court, and general constitutional stability. This is 
especially true in contexts where the Court is protecting minority rights. In this way, the “risks of 
too frequent amendment” may outweigh the benefits of amending at all.  26
Another concern, raised by the US Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, was a fear that 
“frequent amendment [will] threaten minority rights.”  In his testimony about the proposed flag-27
destruction statute after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v Texas, Dellinger expressed 
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 58124
 Publius, “Federalist No. 43: The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further 25
Considered,” The Federalist Papers
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 59126
 Ibid. pg 59227
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that he preferred a statutory response to the decision, rather than a constitutional amendment.  28
Dellinger feared that the usage of amendment in this context would incentivize special interest 
groups who want to “leap over constitutional barriers,” undermining both the Constitution and 
the Supreme Court’s role in it.  At the same time, Dellinger contended that an amendment in this 29
context could lead to an “addiction” by the populace to amendatory change, an issue he viewed 
as a threat to the constitutional system.  30
Differently, University of Chicago law professor David Strauss, who has argued nineteen 
cases before the Supreme Court, contends that for countries with a British origin, constitutional 
interpretation is much more common-law based, rather than purely textual.  As a result, Strauss 31
believes that the American Supreme Court, contrary to popular belief, interprets “the 
Constitution more or less in line with the … changes in circumstances, understandings, and 
majoritarian demands” that would otherwise lead to a successful constitutional amendment.  32
Strauss’ claim is supported by some modern empirical analysis, with works like How Public 
Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court showing that there is a “real, substantively 
important” effect of public opinion on judicial decision-making.  The common-law criticism of 33
amendment is one of the most valid. However, it operates under the assumption that judicial 
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 58228
 Ibid.29
 Rosalind Dixon, "Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective" University of Chicago Public 30
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 347, (2011): pg 96-109
 Ibid.31
 Ibid.32
 Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns, and Patrick C. Wohlfarth, “How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. 33
Supreme Court,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 1 (2010): pp. 74-88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1540-5907.2010.00485.x)
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supremacy is one of the most important principles to follow, with little regard for commitments 
to the ‘consent of the governed’ principle the Founder’s originally based the amendment process 
on. 
Strauss and Dellinger’s criticisms are somewhat unfounded. Dellinger’s fears about 
minority rights being undermined by formal amendment are prescient, but fail to place 
amendatory change in the context of the amendment process that governs it. At the least 
America, with its supermajoritarian voting requirements,  protects minority rights from a 
procedural standpoint. At the same time, most democratic countries have included unamendable 
provisions that permanently enshrine basic rights within their constitutions.  As a result, while 34
Dellinger’s claims are somewhat applicable in America, they do not reflect the effect of formal 
amendment across the world. In turn, Dellinger falls prey to the same issue countless legal 
scholars do in the context of amendment—they fail to take into account the amendment 
procedure and its effects on amendatory outcomes. 
Differently, Strauss’ contention that the Supreme Court generally rules in line with 
changing circumstances is not reflective of the effectiveness of that institution in facilitating 
amendatory change, but instead reveals the failures of Article V in promoting formal amendment. 
Common-law judicial interpretation is a constitutional reality in countries with a British origin, 
but it in no way means the most consequential constitutional questions should solely be settled 
by nine unelected justices. As will be further explained later on in this chapter, an over reliance 
on the judiciary to foment amendatory change undermines constitutional stability, as citizens 
become alienated from the Constitution that governs them. While the American Supreme Court 
has been effective in ensuring that the Constitution keeps up with the times, their increased 
 A deeper discussion of unamendability is found in Chapter 234
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activism in this regard is reflective of a fundamental amendatory problem in America, rather than 
proof that institution should be the sole arbiter of constitutional change. 
University of New South Whales Professor Rosalind Dixon presents two more reasons as 
to why constitutional stability should take pro-tanto priority over amendment. Dixon points to 
the fact that constitutional democracy creates a system in which political competition is possible. 
If this system is too flexible, a slim majority that has political control for a certain period of time 
could “insulate itself against future political competition.”  One of the main functions of a 35
constitution is to establish the ‘rules of the game’ and ensure that “momentary majorities” are 
unable to rig the system.  In this way amendment—and definitely too frequent amendment—36
could undermine the constitutional order. The other issue Dixon thinks amendments could cause 
is a deterioration in “constitutional pre-commitment[s]” like the protection of minority rights.  37
Citizens of a nation may agree that they should make constitutional commitments at one time, 
that they in the future, for partisan reasons or “momentary passions” decide to sacrifice.  38
Interestingly, these issues are less with formal amendment itself, and are actually with 
amendment processes more generally. As a result, Dixon’s criticisms in this context reflect the 
importance of amendment procedures and their effects on amendatory change. If an amendment 
process is too facile, the issues Dixon raises could arise. However, when an amendment process 
is properly crafted to allow for the ‘right’ amount of amendment, the problems Dixon identifies 
 Rosalind Dixon, (2011): pg 10035
 Ibid.36
 Ibid.37
 ibid.38
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are nullified. A deeper discussion of amendment processes, and what the ‘right’ amount of 
amendment is, is found in Chapter 3. 
While these criticisms are valid insofar as too many amendments are likely negative to a 
functioning constitutional democracy, Dixon still believes there are clear benefits to amendment, 
especially when compared to an over-reliance on the Supreme Court or legislative responses. 
Dixon grounds her pro-amendment argument in five main justifications. Primarily, Dixon 
believes that amendment focuses the attention of citizens onto an important constitutional 
question.  For an amendment to succeed, proponents must identify the “constitutional principle 39
at stake”, find areas of consensus, and respond to criticisms by opponents.  As a result, a more 40
deliberative, democratic process occurs, something in line with the Founder’s original normative 
justifications for amendment. Similarly, this inclusive process has a finality to it that Court 
decisions do not—people often contest judicial decisions questioning the legitimacy of the Court.
For example, during his Supreme Court nomination process, Robert Bork testified that he 
would overturn Roe v Wade, even though the constitutional question of abortion had already been 
settled in the Court.  As there is still no formal abortion amendment today, constitutional 41
scholars and justices can still create reasonable legal arguments as to why the Roe v Wade 
decision should be overturned. Although some things should stay open to debate, it is necessary 
that most constitutional questions are settled in a conclusive way, as constant debate over what 
truly amounts to the ‘spirit of the constitution’ is problematic to constitutional stability.42
 Rosalind Dixon, (2011): pg 10139
 Ibid. pg 10240
 Ibid.41
 The reasons as to why constant debate is problematic have already been made earlier in this section. 42
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Another benefit of formal amendment that Jackson points to is that it is an “important 
check on the judiciary.”  The vast majority of constitutions in use today give members of the 43
judiciary unlimited tenure, with some going so far as to have no mandatory retirement age.  44
Justices usually operate within a ‘jurisprudential consensus,’ often binding them to follow 
decisions they may not agree with.  This is evidenced by American Supreme Court Justice John 45
Paul Stevens support of six different amendments to respond to what he thinks are “lines of 
judicial decisions … in need of correction.”  Justice Stevens may think a certain line of 46
decision-making was erroneous, but he would follow it out of respect for the principle of stare 
decisis and other jurisprudential considerations. Without an amendment, justices are bound to 
past decisions in this way.  While countries with regular constitutional court turnover may need 
less of an amendatory response to judicial decisions than in America, it is still an important tool 
with which a constitution can be ‘democratized’. A corrective amendment does nothing to 
undermine the legitimacy of a Supreme Court, but instead protects that Court’s legitimacy by 
preventing them from having to ‘overrule’ past decisions. 
In a similar vein, Jackson believes amendments allow more people to be involved in 
answering questions as to the fundamental nature of a country, something she thinks is 
normatively advantageous to democracy.  While the American federal legislature has 535 47
members, its Court has nine. If the American legislature was active in proposing amendments, 
the process of constitutional discourse would already be more inclusive than if it was solely 
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 59343
 Article III empowers the American federal judiciary to an extent that most novel constitution’s avoid.44
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 59345
 Ibid. pg 59646
 Ibid.47
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litigated through the constitutional court system. Amendment processes—even the least arduous 
ones that require a simple majority in the legislature—are a democratic avenue for constitutional 
discourse to occur. It is important to note that this argument is in no way contending that all 
constitutional questions should be put to amendment. Instead Jackson’s points are meant to 
highlight how the process of amendment is an often overlooked, important means for change. 
The final point Jackson makes about amendments is that they seem to “influence 
jurisprudence in directions similar to those of the amendment[s] [themselves]” even if they fail to 
pass.  When a constitutional court makes a decisions that isn’t bolstered by “political 48
mobilizations,” the ruling is relatively ‘weak’, while they are strongest “when they harmonize 
with more broadly held views.”  This is evidenced by the history of the Equal Rights 49
amendment (ERA). First introduced in 1923, the ERA was not sent to the states until 1972.  The 50
political power of social movements in support of the ERA led the Court to change its equal 
protection jurisprudence before the amendment ever began the ratification process. As a result, 
by 1972, judicial decisions came close to covering almost everything the Equal Rights 
amendment sought to accomplish.51
The most astute readers will begin to see an interesting reality of amendment—its direct 
relationship with the judicial system. When observed in a vacuum, America’s Supreme Court 
appears powerful relative to other countries, as it is constantly ruling on consequential matters. 
However,  this Supreme Court is so active because its amendment procedure is in such disuse. 
 Vicki C. Jackson, (2015): pg 59748
 Ibid. pg 59849
 Ibid.50
 Ibid.51
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The most valid criticisms of amendment are based in a belief that the Supreme Court should be 
the arena in which constitutional matters are decided. However, this American understanding is 
created by the challenges associated with Article V, rather than being truly based on the benefits 
of judicial supremacy. Importantly, Dixon’s arguments in defence of amendment are grounded in 
its benefits to the Supreme Court as a constitutional institution. Namely, Dixon contends 
amendments have a finality to them that court decisions do not, allowing debates to be settled. 
Moreover, Dixon argues that amendments allow citizens to place a check on problematic judicial 
decisions, and influence jurisprudence more generally. A judicial system is one of the most 
important institutions in any constitutional order. As a result, if citizens view their judiciary in 
contempt and feel they have been alienated from the amendatory process, constitutional stability 
is undermined. This contempt is much less likely to occur in a constitutional system where 
constitutional questions are regularly settled by amendment. At the same time, as Dixon 
identified, amendments promote respect for the judiciary as an institution and its role in 
interpreting the constitution. When justices make rulings with novel amendments as the basis, it 
adds weight to their decision-making that pure stare-decisis could never afford. As a result, 
amendatory change through the formal amendment process promotes a functioning judiciary, as 
well as constitutional stability more generally. 
While amendment’s relationship with constitutional stability has been revealed, the 
importance of the formal process has not. Scholars agree that for a constitution to function, it 
must be able to change, but some contend that using the formal amendment process is 
unnecessary. As a result, much of the contemporary amendment debate is centred around what 
truly constitutes a substantive ‘constitutional change’, and whether formal amendments are really 
reflective of such changes. In this way, opponents of ‘amendment formalism’ view the process as 
 21
a necessary constitutional function, but largely superfluous. This thesis takes amendment 
formalism to be a necessary means in promoting the end of constitutional stability. When 
amendment is regularly informal, happening through other means like judicial reinterpretation, it 
undermines constitutional stability. As a result, the claims of legal scholars Sanford Levinson and 
Bruce Ackerman will be presented to highlight the arguments against amendment formalism. 
Interestingly, Ackerman and Levinson’s constitutional understanding is not in contravention with 
the argument of this thesis. Instead, these scholars views highlight the extent to which America’s 
amendatory perspective is informed by their arduous amendment process, rather than being 
reflective of a failure of formal amendment itself. Both scholars attempt to identify informal 
paths of amendatory change used in America, explaining how the formal process has been 
disregarded. While these informal paths can lead to constitutional development, they are 
deleterious to constitutional stability when compared with formal amendment.  
In his aptly-titled work How Many times has the US Constitution been Amended?, 
Levinson delineates between constitutional interpretation and amendment, with amendment 
amounting to “genuine [constitutional] transformation.”  For Levinson, formal amendment can 52
sometimes lead to no ‘genuine transformation’ of the constitution, while a judicial decision 
could, under this definition, amount to constitutional amendment.  As a result, Levinson 53
believes that a constitutional development’s effect is more important than the procedure it goes 
through. For example, Levinson could argue that based on the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
clause jurisprudence, women are afforded equal rights under the Constitution. As a result, if the 
Sanford Levinson, “Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States 52
Constitution Been Amended? (a) <26; (b) 26; (c) >26; (d) all of the above),” Constitutional Commentary, Volume 8, 
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Equal Rights Amendment had passed in 1970s, it would not have been a ‘genuine 
transformation’ of the constitution, and while it may have been a formal amendment, it would not 
truly amount to an ‘amendment’ of the Constitution.  This conflicts with the traditional 
constitutional understanding, espoused by Justices like Felix Frankfurter, who believe that 
“nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the amendment process. Nothing 
old can be taken out with the same process.”  54
Importantly, this disagreement has raged since America’s founding. When attacking the 
legitimacy of the First Bank of the United States, President James Madison contended that the 
constitution was one of “limited and enumerated powers” such that “no power … not enumerated 
could be inferred from the general nature of government.”  In promotion of this view, Madison 55
vetoed an 1817 piece of legislation that was focused on internal infrastructure improvements.  56
Although Madison acknowledged the necessity of these developments, he believed that Congress 
did not have the power to perform such an action.  As a result, Madison argued that for this 57
legislation to be constitutional, there must be an amendment in relation to national powers.  58
While Madison’s argument was convincing, it appears that over time, the formalists lost out to 
those who view many constitutional questions as open-ended. While Levinson does not take a 
stance as to which process is normatively superior, he believes that the American Constitution is 
regularly amended without any formal process.59
 Sanford Levinson, (1991): pg 41554
 Ibid.55
 Ibid.56
 Ibid.57
 Ibid.58
 Ibid. pg 41659
 23
It is important to note that the founding formalists seemed to lose the debate to the 
functionalists like Levinson. However, this is not due to a failure in the normative strength of 
Madison’s arguments. Instead, it is reflective of the challenges of the Article V amendment 
process. Had America’s amendment process been an easier endeavour, with citizens turning to it 
rather than the Supreme Court for fundamental constitutional developments, Levinson’s 
argument would not carry weight. As a ramification of the challenges associated with Article V, 
Levison’s opposition to formal amendment and his contentions about constitutional 
developments are seemingly valid.
Consequently, there are clear differences between amendatory change and interpretation. 
Levinson believes that for a political act to be a genuine constitutional interpretation, it must be 
one of two things—a judicial decision that uses the existing “body of legal materials” as its basis, 
or a legislative/executive action that is not ‘disallowed by the constitution.’  When a branch of 60
government performs an action that is not one of these two things, but has a “relatively marginal” 
effect, it could be described as an amendment. The 1934 case Home Building & Loan 
Association v Blaisdell reveals the extent to which a court decision, that purports to be an 
interpretation, can in practice amount to amendment. 
Home Building & Loan Association v Blaisdell considered the question as to whether a 
Minnesota state law in defence of borrowers violated the Article I Section 10 Contracts Clause.  61
The clause states that “no state shall … pass any … law impairing the obligation of contract.”  62
The court, led by Chief Justice Hughes, decided that this clause meant that states could not pass 
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laws that “unreasonably impaired contracts” but could pass ones “deemed necessary to important 
state ends.”  In defence of his decision, Hughes contended that the economic emergency in the 63
country made the conditions where such a law could be passed.  In dissent, Justice Sutherland 64
explained how the Contracts Clause was specifically included in the Constitution to “forestall 
[exactly this type of] debtor relief legislation.”  In the face of such criticism, Hughes still 65
concluded that no amendment was necessary, as the justifications for such an action was still 
‘found within the Constitution’s enumerated powers.’  Interestingly, Sutherland’s arguments 66
against the constitutionality of this Minnesota law followed the same line of reasoning as 
Madison’s. However, just as how Madison eventually lost his battle for enumeration, so too did 
Sutherland. 
As a result, the Home Building & Loan Association v Blaisdell decision is an example of 
what Levinson would describe as a political action that doesn’t use existing jurisprudence or isn’t 
clearly found within the Constitution’s clauses. In this way, this decision is an example of an 
‘informal’ amendment. As has been mentioned earlier, it is problematic that the Supreme Court 
regularly steps in to make such consequential rulings. If America’s amendment process had less 
stringent requirements, more amendments would be passed and citizens would more regularly 
turn to amendment as a valid option for constitutional development. In turn, the Court would feel 
less pressure to rule with ‘enumeration’ as the basis as it did in Blaisdell, and the constitutional 
question as to the legitimacy of such laws would be settled. In turn, citizens today would be 
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unable to take issue with New Deal legislation had Roosevelt and other advocates pursued 
amendment, rather than the Supreme Court, as the avenue for constitutional change. When there 
is a high level of demand for amendatory change—as was seen in the Great Depression—and no 
opportunity for formal amendment, other institutions have to step in to facilitate the 
developments or the Constitution will fall out of line with the goals of its citizens. This 
undermines constitutional stability, as functioning institutions and citizens belief in them is 
paramount to any constitutional order. 
Differently, Levinson argues that many formal amendments are somewhat superfluous, and 
in practice do not lead to substantive change in the way some informal amendments often do.  67
For example, in the 1966 case Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, a 6-3 majority on the Court 
ruled that the Virginia poll tax violated the Equal Protection clause of the 14th amendment.  68
This judicial interpretation amounted to what Levinson would describe as an amendatory change 
to the Constitution. Interestingly, just two years later, the 24th amendment was finally ratified, 
banning such poll taxes. As a result, while the 24th amendment had some effect in the ways 
Vicki Jackson points to, insofar as it ended any further debate about the constitutionality of such 
taxes, it did not change the Constitution nearly to the degree that Harper v Virginia Board of 
Elections did. This example elucidates Levinson’s argument about the differences between 
amendatory and interpretative changes to the Constitution, and how informal developments 
could amount to either. Harper v Virginia Board of Elections functionally served as a 
constitutional guarantee of the same goals as the 24th amendment. In turn, Levinson contends 
that the judicial decision amounted to a ‘constitutional amendment’ while the formal amendment 
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did not. With these examples in mind, Levinson’s skepticism about there truly being a way to 
deduce the total number of constitutional amendments appears valid. 
Importantly, the fact that one is unable to fully deduce the number of ‘real’ amendments to 
the American Constitution is not reflective of the inadequacies of formal amendment. Instead, 
this reality is reflective of the challenges associated with the Article V amendment process, and 
alludes to a problematic constitutional environment in America. If America’s citizens, politicans, 
and legal scholars are unable to comprehend their Constitution and the ways it has changed, 
constitutional stability is undermined. As Professor Vicki Jackson explained, a constitutional 
society can not regularly disagree about the fundamental structure of their constitution. Citizens 
need to be in agreement as to what is constitutional, and then operate within those boundaries. It 
is also a reality that justices and politicians will continue to disagree about what is constitutional, 
but the level of disparity in their arguments is exacerbated and increased when there is no formal 
amendment. Without amendment, the ‘Overton window’—-the range of acceptable policies—
widens such that agreement may never be found. When politicians and citizens are unable to find 
a constitutional consensus, they become alienated from their constitution and the institutions it 
creates. In turn, a dearth in amendment, and its widening of the Overton window, lead to a 
deterioration in constitutional stability. 
Another opponent of formalism in their understanding of amendatory change is Yale law 
professor Bruce Ackerman. Somewhat different from Levinson, Ackerman believes there are two 
‘lawmaking tracks’, a normal track where laws are made by the legislature or through executive 
action, and the higher track, where principles are established by “spokespersons for the 
people.”  As a result, Ackerman believes that American constitutional development is marked 69
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by “rare moments when movements for constitutional transformation earn broad and deep 
support for their initiatives” rather than a series of 27 amendments.  For these transformations to 70
occur, Ackerman contends that there are periods of ‘constitutional politics’ where an “engaged 
citizenry” discuss fundamental issues, in between periods of normal politics.  For example, in 71
1860, it was still an open constitutional question as to the legality of slavery, but by 1870, the 
consensus was that slavery was unconstitutional.  The decade in between these two times 72
amounted to what Ackerman would describe as a period of ‘constitutional politics.’ While there 
was a few formal amendments during this time, there was a much more integral change in the 
‘higher law’ of America.
Before delving further into examples of these periods of constitutional politics and the 
mechanisms for change they use, it is first important to establish the theoretical basis for 
Ackerman’s argument. Fundamental to Ackerman is the fact that there is no part of Article V that 
says the Constitution “may only be amended through the following procedures and in other 
way”.  As a result, Ackerman doesn’t want to give the ‘founding amendatory rules’ a monopoly 73
“over the methods of amendment.”  Ackerman believes that this wasn’t an accident by the 74
Founders, as he believes “American’s owe their remarkable constitutional continuity only to their 
repeated successes in unconventional adaptations of pre-existing institutions at moments of grave 
crisis.”  This claim is somewhat erroneous, and has been shown in prior sections, there was 75
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disagreement between the Framers as to what the amendment process would look like in the 
novel American Constitution, with many wanting to give the “founding amendatory rules” a 
monopoly. Ackerman’s second claim, that America’s constitutional continuity—‘stability’—was 
created by institutions adapting to amend the Constitution, is reflective of the failures of the 
formal amendment process rather than the effectiveness of these institutions in settling 
constitutional questions. Ackerman falls prey to the same issues of Levinson—while 
functionally, American institutions have been effective in promoting constitutional stability by 
informally amending the constitution when there is demand for it, this stability would be better 
supported through the use of formal amendment. 
Interestingly, Ackerman’s conclusions about the passage of the 14th amendment support 
the arguments in favour of amendment formalism. Ackerman believes the constitutional change 
associated with the 14th amendment happened in four stages, which Ackerman uses as a 
framework for the transformations he describes. The first stage of this process was a 
‘constitutional impasse’ in 1866.  While the 13th amendment had passed with support of 76
President Andrew Johnson, he was an avowed opponent of the 14th amendment. However, 
Congress was overwhelmingly Republican, and refused to allow the ‘constitutional 
conservatives’ to have their way. As is emblematic of this ‘impasse stage’, both branches of 
government “challenged the very right of their opponent to speak on fundamental matters in the 
name of We The People.”   Congressional Republicans feared that if they put the amendment to 77
ratification before having decisive support, the 11 states returning to the Union from the 
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Confederacy would be able to ‘veto’ such an effort.  As a result, the 1866 mid-term election was 78
centred on the passage of the 14th amendment, with Johnson trying to bolster opposition 
nationally.  This lead to what Ackerman described as the second stage of the transformation 79
process, the electoral mandate stage. 
The 1866 election proved to be an emphatic victory for the Republicans, with them seizing 
an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress.  Before the election, both Johnson and 80
Congress purported to speak for the citizens of America. However, after the election, Johnson 
was unable to claim the same political legitimacy he could prior. Johnson continued to oppose 
the amendment, leading 10 states in opposition. Congress, now with a legitimate justification as 
to why they are the ‘voice of We The People’, began to undermine the ‘dissenting political 
institutions’ that opposed the amendment.  First, Congress passed the Reconstruction Act, which 81
laid out a series of conditions the Confederate states would have to meet in order to be 
readmitted to the Union. One of the conditions the Republicans’ ascribed was the ratification of 
the 14th amendment, exemplifying Ackerman’s understanding of Article V—it may be the only 
formal amendment process, but it is not the only mechanism to facilitate amendatory change. At 
the same time, congressional Republicans began the impeachment process against Johnson, as he 
attempted to make the 14th amendment an issue of the 1868 election.  Johnson understood that 82
if he were to be impeached and convicted by the Senate, it would permanently undermine the 
 Bruce Ackerman, (1995): pg 7678
 Ibid.79
 Ibid.80
 Ibid. pg 8081
 Ibid. pg 8182
 30
institution of the presidency.  As a result, before the vote was put to the Senate, Johnson 83
reversed his position on the 14th amendment, reflecting what Ackerman describes as the fourth 
stage of this constitutional process, the ‘switch in time’.  With Johnson’s backtracking on his 84
previous stance, the 14th amendment was ratified, creating a ‘constitutional consensus’ as to the 
rights of people of colour in America. 
The history of the passage of the 14th amendment reveals each of the four stages 
Ackerman describes. The first is a constitutional impasse or conflict, where different branches of 
government disagree about constitutional understanding, leading to a higher lawmaking 
situation.  The second is the ‘constitutional support’ stage, where those involved in the higher-85
lawmaking process advocate for their beliefs nationally, usually using an electoral victory as the 
basis for contending that the public supports their views.  As was evidenced by the process of 86
ratifying the 14th amendment, it is challenging for a branch of government to claim legitimacy 
after losing an election. This leads to the third stage, where the branches of government begin to 
challenge the right of others to speak on the constitutional matter, such as when the Republican’s 
passed the Reconstruction act with its rigid provisions or their impeachment of Johnson.  This 87
leads to the fourth stage, the ‘switch in time’ or moment of ‘constitutional consensus, where 
those involved in the higher lawmaking process finally agree as to what is best for the country.   88
If the Reconstruction Republicans had not passed these amendments, and instead relied on the 
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Court to informally amend the Constitution to ensure the equal rights of black Americans, it is 
likely that the debate would never be settled. One can easily imagine a modern American arguing 
that equality of race is found nowhere in the Constitution, and that the Court was erroneous in 
ruling so. This is reflective of how formal constitutional amendments shrink the Overton window 
such that reasonable, productive political debate can occur with everyone operating under the 
same assumptions. 
Consequently, Ackerman believes that the Reconstruction Republicans established a 
mechanism for constitutional change outside of the Article V process which is used to this day in 
times of higher law making. Ackerman points to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s use of 
this higher-lawmaking process as the next most quintessential example. However, President 
Roosevelt’s usage of this same four step mechanism in the New Deal era lead to three very 
different, fundamental ramifications for amendatory change. The first of these effects was to the 
executive branch. President Roosevelt ran on a transformative platform, and although he had a 
wide electoral mandate, he still faced opposition from the Supreme Court.  As a result, 89
Roosevelt brought these constitutional questions to forefront of the 1936 election, formalizing 
the role of the President as a constitutional thought leader.  In trying to facilitate the changes he 90
ran on in the face of a hostile Court, Roosevelt’s attempted to expand the number of justices from 
9 to 15, ensuring he had a majority on the Court.  This had an unseen consequence, the effect of 91
which has become more pronounced with time—the creation of “transformative judicial 
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appointments.”  After Roosevelt’s court-packing threat, the Supreme Court of the 1940s 92
“unanimously swept away entire doctrinal structures” like those established in Lochner v New 
York in support of the policies Roosevelt advocated for, an example of what Ackerman would 
characterize as the ‘switch in time’.  For Ackerman—and Levinson—these judicial decisions 93
“operate today as the functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments.”  In this way, 94
by building on the efforts of the Reconstruction Republicans, Roosevelt finalized this new 
system of ‘higher law-making.’
The history of the New Deal and the ‘Higher Lawmaking’ associated supports the claims 
made throughout this thesis about the importance of formal amendment. Roosevelt either never 
considered using the formal amendment process, or felt it too challenging in pursuit of the 
constitutional developments he wanted. As a result, Roosevelt and his supporters ‘threatened’ the 
Supreme Court, pressuring it to change its jurisprudence. In doing so, Roosevelt helped to 
establish the concept of consequential Supreme Court appointments, a constitutionally 
problematic practice. The trend of politicization of the Supreme Court started by Roosevelt, 
although with good reason, has led to a deterioration in the public trust of that institution. 
Citizens of America usually support the Supreme Court’s rulings when they are in line with their 
own political beliefs, rather than on the grounds of the constitutionality of the decision. In turn, 
trust in the Supreme Court has deteriorated over time, and this has undermined America’s overall 
constitutional stability. 
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Similarly, Ackerman concedes there are some benefits to amendment formalism. 
Importantly, formalism creates an environment in which all political actors know the ‘game they 
are playing,’ the rules of that game, and the “constitutional struggle that lies ahead.”  Once an 95
amendment is passed, it is virtually impossible to continue to contest it. As a result, groups are 
unable to ‘explain away defeat’ by arguing they were unaware of the political competition that 
was being played.  For example, critics of New Deal jurisprudence continue to question its 96
legitimacy, even though almost all follow it out of respect for stare decisis and other 
jurisprudential considerations.  The formal amendment process gives a predetermined point at 97
which a new amendment will reveal “a clear winner or a clear loser”, showing when the process 
has ended, an added benefit that transformative judicial opinions do not have.  This is evidenced 98
by the appointments of justices like Robert Bork or Antonin Scalia, both of whom argued against 
the legitimacy of Roe v Wade long after the constitutional matter had arguably been settled. If the 
formal amendment process had been used, there would be no way for these justices to argue that 
abortion is unconstitutional.
Even with these benefits, Ackerman identifies two dangers of formalism in the amendment 
process—the threats of what he calls ‘false positives’ and a ‘false negatives.’  The formal 99
process by which an amendment is passed leads to a normative conclusion by society that the 
constitutional change was reflective of sustained support for a new solution. However, this is not 
always the case, as was evidenced by the single-issue politics used to pass the Prohibition 
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amendment, and the subsequent political reversal that occurred years later. As a result, the 
passage of an amendment—although challenging due to institutional barriers—may still lead to 
the understanding that support by the populace for such a change was present when it in fact was 
not. This erroneous belief in public support caused by amendment is what Ackerman refers to as 
a false positive.  The issue of ‘false negatives’ is even more serious. As Ackerman explains, “by 
making it hard for a momentary special-interest coalition to impersonate the People, the 
formalist’s obstacle course may stifle the expression of constitutional movements that, after years 
of mobilized debate that has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of ordinary citizens, won 
the sustained support of a decisive and sustained majority.”  100
Ackerman believes that both the Reconstruction Republicans, as well as the New Deal 
Democrats, were at risk of this false negative threat, and had they tried to facilitate the 
constitutional change they—and The People—supported through Article V, the amendments 
wouldn’t have been ratified even though there was the requisite “decisive … majority.”  As a 101
result, the difficulty of a formal amendment process may lead to the conclusion that there is no 
motive for change, when in fact proponents of amendatory change feel they cannot facilitate 
their goals through the formal mechanism. 
The fear of a ‘false negative’ is unfounded when the amendment process is properly crafted 
such that a moderate amount of amendment is able to occur.  In America, with its extremely 102
challenging amendment process, this fear is more valid, but is reflective of the inadequacies of 
Article V rather than a prescient threat of ‘false negatives.’ If Article V had less stringent 
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requirements, the threat of ‘false negatives’ would be diminished almost completely. The issue of 
‘false positives’ is tougher to address, but can again be solved through a properly formulated 
amendment process. Both of these issues, false positives and negatives, are not related to formal 
amendment itself, but instead created by the amendment procedure that governs a constitution. 
As will be shown in Chapter 3, amendment procedures can be built to promote an amount of 
amendment that supports constitutional stability, avoiding these problems. 
Both Ackerman and Levinson present a nuanced picture as to what truly amounts to 
amendatory change, while revealing the extent to which constitutional efforts by political actors 
can amount to ‘amendment’ without ever utilizing the formal process. However, neither deny the 
importance of the formal process. Levinson believes that practically, amendments happen outside 
the Article V process, while Ackerman fears that Article V is too stringent in its institutional 
barriers. As a result, a more finely tuned amendment process could allow for the changes both 
authors describe, and also prevent the threat of false negatives that Ackerman fears. In this way, 
it seems that the opponents of formalism have less normative criticisms of the process, and 
instead question Article V’s practical import.
This debate about amendatory change was largely centred around its effects in America. By 
considering amendment processes from a comparative standpoint, it appears there are a lot more 
benefits to formalism than Levinson or Ackerman let on. Specifically, in her work Constitutional 
Amendment Rules: A comparative perspective Rosalind Dixon presents a powerful argument as 
to formal amendment’s positive effects on a constitutional order.
The first and most integral role Dixon believes amendments play is to facilitate a “whole-
scale revision” of a constitutional system.  For example, the adoption of the Canadian Charter 103
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of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 completely changed Canada’s governmental structure as well as 
the rights afforded to individuals.  Changes to this degree have to happen through amendment, 104
as otherwise, their legitimacy could never be proven. In this way, “formal constitutional 
amendment procedures serve not only to promote the chances of large-scale constitutional 
change, but also to increase the chances that such change will occur” within the existing 
constitutional schema.  As a result, Dixon believes formal amendment processes serve as the 105
source of what Rawl’s once called “constitutional transparency.”  Constitutional stability 106
necessitates trust on the part of its citizens in the constitutional system, and if whole-scale 
revisions were to occur without using the formal process, it would transparently alienate the 
citizenry from their institutions. 
Besides ‘revision’, Dixon believes that amendments have two important effects in the 
context of the Supreme Court. Amendments can be used in a ‘generative’ way to “jump-start … 
new interpretations of the constitution by courts,” as well as in a ‘trumping’ manner, overriding 
“existing judicial interpretations.”  Dixon believes this process allows citizens to participate in 107
constitutional discourse directly, reducing the ‘agency costs’ associated with representative 
government.  Both of these effects promote popular sovereignty, and can facilitate these 108
changes in two ways—amendments can change the textual basis with which judicial 
interpretation is made, or they can change the public understanding of the constitution more 
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generally. As Professor Vicki Jackson noted, ratified amendments, as well as proposed 
amendments, affect “[the] court’s willingness to respond to democratic pressures for 
constitutional change,” serving as a clear expression of the will of The People.  109
Dixon notes that there are differences in the language of trumping and generative 
amendments. Generative amendments are usually “broad and open-ended” removing 
jurisprudential restrictions on otherwise unclear standards, while trumping amendments are 
explicit and concrete, meant to overhaul prior judicial interpretations.  The history of the 11th 110
amendment elucidates what a trumping amendment looks like in practice.  In the 1793 case 111
Chisolm v Georgia, the Court ruled that the plaintiff, a citizen of South Carolina, could file suit 
against Georgia in the ‘original jurisdiction’ of the Supreme Court.  The state of Georgia 112
refused to appear in court, stating that there was no standing to sue a sovereign state in federal 
court. The Court disagreed, arguing that they could in fact hear the case. This decision angered 
countless defenders of state sovereignty, and prompted the passage of the 11th amendment. 
Passed a year later, the 11th amendment states that the “judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to a any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state” 
explicitly rebuking the Court’s decision.  113
The decision was not revisited until 1890, when the Court overturned Chisolm in Hans v 
Louisiana, arguing they could revisit the constitutional question due to the “adoption of the 11th 
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amendment.” In Hans, the Court held that “due to state sovereign immunity, federal courts do not 
have jurisdiction over legal actions against a state to recover money damages.”  The oral 114
arguments in Hans included not only arguments about the legal ramifications of the 11th 
amendment, but also the public sentiment reflected by the passage of the amendment. In this 
way, textually specific ‘trumping’ amendments reveal to the Court—and the nation more 
generally—how the public feels about a certain judicial decision, and are effective in influencing 
the Court’s jurisprudence when it is not in line with The People’s constitutional understanding.  115
Differently, Dixon uses the example of the 1967 Indigenous Rights amendments to the 
Australian Commonwealth Constitution to illustrate the effect of generative amendments. The 
‘Indigenous Australians’ amendment package included provisions to include aboriginal 
Australians in future censuses, as well as empower the federal parliament to legislate in 
protection of this ethnic group. Specifically, the amendments involved the deletion of Section 
127,  which specified that in the census, “aboriginal natives shall not be counted.”  Similarly, 116
the amendments changed Section 51, which establishes the legislative power of federal 
parliament, removing the specification that the legislature “[has] power to make laws for peace, 
order and good government … [for] The people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in 
any State.”  While these amendments didn’t add any new text to the Australian Constitution, 117
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they were extremely ‘generative’ in the way they effected subsequent constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
An example of this generative effect is found in the 2009 Wurridjal v Commonwealth of 
Australia decision, where the Australian Supreme Court used the 1967 amendments as the basis 
for their decision.  The plaintiffs argued that the Australian government had unconstitutionally 118
seized aboriginal land property without providing ‘just terms’ of agreement, a constitutionally 
guaranteed right.   While the Australian constitution does not specify what ‘just terms’ 119
constitutes, Constitutional Court Justice Kirby stressed that because the 1967 amendments were 
meant to make the constitution inclusive of the aboriginal populations, the amendments had 
“incorporate[d] notions of property as understood by indigenous aboriginals” into the 
constitution.  Although the amendments did not explicitly pertain to property or its definition, 120
they were generative in creating a new jurisprudential understanding as to the rights of 
aboriginals and the normative implications for the amendments more generally. Kirby concluded 
that the “effect of the 1967 amendments was to ensure that the Australian Constitution now 
speaks with equality to all aboriginal Australians, by observing traditional customs.”  In this 121
way, an amendment could solely remove text from a constitution, yet still be generative in 
changing the lens with which justices view the document they are tasked with interpreting. 
Consequently, the trumping and generative effects of amendment identified by Dixon are 
just two ways in which the formal process promotes constitutional stability. Seemingly, these 
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amendments have the effect of diminishing the judicial system’s role in constitutional 
development. In actuality, formal amendments of this type strengthen the ability of the judiciary 
to rule on consequential constitutional matters. When the judiciary can only rely on past 
jurisprudence with little textual basis, their decisions lack the clout of those made in the context 
of an amendment. When a constitutional system experiences little to no formal amendment, this 
problem of judicial illegitimacy is exacerbated, as the judiciary has to step-in to an even greater 
degree to meet the demand for amendatory change. In turn, amendments actually strengthen the 
role of the judiciary in constitutional development, rather than diminish it, by affording 
constitutional courts the ability to rule in transformative ways. 
Ackerman and Levinson’s arguments as to the informal reality of America’s constitutional 
developments build on, rather than undermine, the claims made in this thesis as to the 
relationship between amendment, amendment procedure, and constitutional stability. In 
Levinson’s case, the fact that Americans are unable to accurately discern the number of 
amendments to their constitution is detrimental to constitutional stability, and also reveals how 
active the American Supreme Court is in informally amending the Constitution. Differently, 
Ackerman’s description of moments of ‘higher-lawmaking’ is accurate, but Roosevelt’s inability 
to use the formal amendment process to facilitate the constitutional changes he wanted reflects 
the challenges of the Article V amendment procedure rather than issues with formal amendment 
itself. In actuality, Roosevelt likely would have much preferred promoting constitutional 
developments via amendment, but was inhibited by the arduous process. In both contexts, formal 
amendment promotes constitutional stability more than informal amendment, and while informal 
amendment happens regularly, it can become problematic. 
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Consequently, the concept of amendment is as old as the American Constitution. The 
founders based their arguments in favour of amendment on the principles of the consent of the 
governed, human fallibility, and the importance of the Constitution as ‘higher law.’ The Framers 
believed that the Constitution would have to go through a process of formal change, one which 
had to be arduous enough to prevent a small group from undermining constitutional order. 
However, as constitutional democracies have developed across the world, there have been many 
critics of amendatory change, who support judicial supremacy or fear that too frequent 
amendment will destroy a constitutional system. Fears of too frequent amendment are valid, but 
at least in America, amendment has happened too infrequently. When a constitution is not 
changed formally but requires updating, informal changes are facilitated by actors outside the 
amendment process. While scholars like Levinson and Ackerman may view the informal changes 
as a practical reality, even they concede that often, the best avenue for constitutional change is 
through the formal system. However, in America, it appears that the Article V may be too 
arduous, often preventing amendments, creating the ‘false negatives’ that Ackerman fears. With 
all this in mind, it appears that the issues found in this chapter are less with amendments 
specifically, and more with the processes that govern them. Consequently, the importance of 
formal amendment, its relationship with the amendment procedure, and the effect of this 
procedure on constitutional stability has been established.
Chapter 2: Unamendability and its Relationship to Amendment
Section 1: Unamedability in America:
Amendments amount to formal constitutional change. However, constitutional stability 
inherently necessitates some things to remain the same. As a result, for formal amendment to 
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promote constitutional stability, and for the amendment procedure to do the same, there must be 
some constitutional provisions that cannot be changed. This is where the concept of 
unamendability comes into play—some provisions of the constitution are immutable, and if they 
were to change, the entire constitutional order would be upended. As a result, unamendability 
serves multiple important functions—it highlights the constitutional identity of document, adds 
strength to the amendment process by limiting what can be changed, and gives jurisprudential 
clout to constitutional courts to rule on the constitutionality of amendments. In turn, 
unamendable provisions promote constitutional stability, and are an important piece of any 
amendment process. Through the analysis of unamendable provisions in countries’ constitutions 
across the world, as well as their effect on the constitutional systems they govern, the 
relationship between unamendability, amendment procedures, and constitutional stability is. 
elucidated. 
While Americans had the first ‘eternity’ clauses placed in their Constitution, these 
unamendable provisions were not in line with the modern normative understanding. At the time 
of its creation, the American Constitution had only two unamendable clauses included in Article 
V. The first was a guarantee on slave importation, which had a built in termination of 20 years.  122
The second was a provision that no state would be deprived equal suffrage in the Senate.  123
Importantly, both of these clauses have clear political calculations baked into them, and the 
debate at the Constitutional Convention reveals the extent to which the Founding Fathers felt the 
inclusion of such unamendability was necessary. 
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Article V was one of the last things discussed at the Convention. On September 10th—a 
mere week before the end of the Convention—the first amendment proposal was made.  124
Originally, this proposal allowed for the legislatures of 2/3rds of the States to call for a 
convention. Founding Fathers like Elbridge Gerry, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton 
opposed such a process, each for different reasons. While Gerry feared that such a process would 
“bind the union to innovations that may subvert the state-Constitutions altogether,” Hamilton 
worried that the States would only use such a process to increase their own powers at the 
expense of the federal government’s.  Differently, Madison objected to the vagueness of such a 125
provision, suggesting his own mechanism: “The Legislature of the U—S—whenever two thirds 
of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of 
the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid … when 
the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof.”  John Rutledge, a delegate from South Carolina, 126
amended Madison’s proposal immediately, including the 20-year slave provision out of fear that 
the Constitution “might be altered by the States not interested in [slave] property and prejudiced 
against it.”  While Madison may not have agreed with such a clause, in pursuit of ratification, 127
he conceded. 
After Madison’s process was generally agreed upon, many at the Convention began to 
suggest the addition of provisos that would prevent certain constitutional changes out of fear of 
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what future governments would do. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who in July of that same 
year had crafted the ‘compromise’ that created the Senate’s state-based representation, feared 
“that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as 
abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate.”  As a result, 128
Sherman suggested a proviso specifying that that “no State should be affected in its internal 
police, or deprived of its equality in the Senate.”  Madison disagreed completely with such a 129
clause, contending that if it were to be added, every state would “insist on [such constitutional 
limitations] for their boundaries, exports” and countless other protections.  Eventually, 130
Gouverneur Morris of New York’s amendment, “that no State, without its consent shall be 
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate” was adopted, with Madison blaming its inclusion on 
“the circulating murmurs of the small States.”131
With the final part of the Constitution, that which would be unamendable, agreed upon, it 
was sent to the States for ratification. The debate around the additions of such provisions reveals 
the extent to which the Founding Fathers were sceptical of such clauses. It was clear that most of 
the Framers believed the document should be changed as the people see fit, in line with the 
principle of the consent of the governed. For Madison, the adopted unamendable clauses were 
politically practical, rather than constitutionally beneficial. As a result, Madison would have 
preferred the already arduous Article V amendment process to be the only thing that stood in the 
way of constitutional change. The disagreements between the framers at the Convention reveal 
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an important normative consensus—unamendable provisions in a constitutional negotiation 
invite political calculations and clauses that often serve to defend the interests of certain groups. 
This theme of unamendability—its protection of interest groups—is common throughout 
the world’s constitutions, but is rarely as apparent as it was in America.  As with all parts of a 132
constitution, amendment procedures are the product of a negotiation, but due to their nature of 
‘controlling the future,’ the eventually agreed-upon mechanisms often serve as a window with 
which the disparate goals and principles of a country’s founders can be identified. This 
expression of founders’ goals is most transparent in the parts of the constitution that are 
permanently unamendable. While sometimes this interest group pressure leads to the inclusion of 
the type of clauses found within the American Constitution, in the rest of the world, it has led to 
the opposite. Regularly, the only thing different interest groups can agree upon when crafting a 
constitution is uncontroversial democratic principles and rights. As a result, due to the fact that 
there must unanimity in constitutional creation, unamendable clauses tend to protect the things 
all citizens can agree upon. 
Consequently, unamendable—‘eternity’—clauses in constitutions throughout the world 
serve as a point of consensus, rather than disagreement, allowing a constitution to have a central, 
agreed-upon identity. When eternity clauses are transparent in what they are permanently 
enshrining, debates on the matter are settled, and citizens can use the ideals espoused in those 
clauses as the basis for constitutional arguments. This argument will be continued later on in the 
chapter in more detail. 
While these two provisions amount to the only explicit limits included in the 
Constitution, there are still many students of the America’s founding document who contend that 
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there are other ‘implicit constraints’ on the document that prevent certain changes. This idea of 
informal unamendability was first put forward by John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. Calhoun 
believed that the States had the right to nullify laws they felt the federal government did not have 
the power to enact.  More drastic, Calhoun contended that if a constitutional amendment 133
“radically change[d] the character of the constitution or the nature of the system,” the states had 
a right to secede.  After the Confederacy’s defeat in the Civil War, Calhoun’s arguments lost 134
support. However, in 1893, legal commentator Thomas Cooley wrote an influential article as to 
how there were “limitations … that stand unquestionably as restrictions upon the power to 
amend.”  To elucidate his understanding, Cooley came up with what he viewed as four 135
examples of ‘unconstitutional’ constitutional amendments. Specifically, Cooley believed that 
amendments to remove a part of the Union, give States disparate tax rules, establish nobility, or 
create a monarchy, were all transparent cases of unconstitutional amendments. Cooley argued 
that the 15 amendments that had come so far were all in “the direction of further extending the 
democratic principles which underlie our Constitution” and therefore constitutional. For Cooley, 
the Founding Fathers “stopped short of forbidding such changes as would be inharmonious” 
because they believed that no political actor would ever attempt to amend the Constitution in 
such a clear violation of the document’s underlying principles. As a result, “however formal 
might be the process of adoption … [the amendments] would just as certainly be declared 
inadmissible and therefore invalid.”136
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Cooley’s contentions have been supported by modern scholars like Walter Murphy and 
George Wright. Murphy believes that certain provisions of the Constitution are so consequential 
that they cannot be voided.  Murphy uses the hypothetical of an amendment that allows for 137
clear racial discrimination as the quintessential example of such an unconstitutional 
amendment.  Such an amendment would have to be invalidated by the Supreme Court, as it 138
“contradict[s] the basic purposes of the whole constitutional system.”  Similarly, George 139
Wright argues that “no 'amendment' can be valid if it leaves what it purports to amend as a 
smoldering, meaningless wreckage; rather, such an 'amendment' can only be enacted as part of a 
new constitution with which it is organically compatible.”  If an amendment is so disparate 140
from the original goals of the constitution it is changing, “for reasons of logic rather than 
morality, the "amendment" cannot reasonably be regarded as in fact a genuine amendment to the 
Constitution, but rather as the genesis of a new and separate constitution.”141
Murphy’s fears of problematic amendment reflect the importance of eternity clauses and 
unamendable provisions more generally.  If minority rights are included in a country’s 
unamendable provisions, constitutional courts can reasonably rule against any amendment that 
would abrogate these rights. Similarly, if America had an eternity clause in its Constitution that 
simply outlined “permanent equality under the law,” a Court could still rule against the type of 
racist amendment Murphy takes issue with. However, without any unamendable provisions, the 
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Court loses jurisprudential clout in invalidating amendments. If the American people were able 
to utilize the already arduous Article V process and ratify an amendment, what right does the 
Court have in nullifying it? Formal amendment is one of the most transparent expressions of the 
will of the people. If a court were to invalidate a formal amendment, it needs serious 
jurisprudential grounds for doing so. Importantly, only unamendable provisions afford courts this 
ability. Moreover, these concerns highlight the importance of amendment procedure and its role 
in facilitating amendments. Any amendment process must be finely tuned to allow for an amount 
of amendment that promotes constitutional stability without turning the constitution into, as 
Wright said, a “smoldering, meaningless, wreck.” 
Interestingly, constitutional law scholar John R. Vile disagrees with Wright and Murphy 
completely, from both a practical and normative standpoint. Primarily, Vile believes that it was in 
no way the Framers intent to include implicit restrictions to the amendment process. The 
Constitution is already explicit in the limits it places on the amendment procedure, and as the 
Convention debate reveals, many other restrictions were rejected because they are problematic. 
The Framers understood that that amendments were necessary piece of the constitutional puzzle, 
and should be used as such. At the time of the Convention, constitutional jurisprudence was a 
novel idea, and there was no discussion of unamendability as there were very few constitutions 
to serve as a reference. As a result, Vile believes it was in no way the intention of the Founders to 
include any ‘implicit’ limitations on amendment. 
Differently, Vile believes that a judicial invalidation of an amendment would be a seizure 
of power by this branch from the people. Judicial review is accepted on the basis that, if the 
people will it, they can amend the Constitution. As a result, if this right by the people was 
stripped, the legitimacy of the Court would be decimated—nine unelected judges should never 
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decide the rights of the People in perpetuity. Similarly, the Court is often deterred from 
controversial decisions they think would be quickly amended, as scholars like Vicki Jackson 
have argued. In this way, to allow the Court to invalidate amendment based on substance would 
be a clear threat to the founding principle of ‘consent of the governed” and could undermine the 
entire constitutional order.  For example, the Court ruled in Dredd Scott that the Constitution 142
was made by and for whites, such that the rights enshrined within it could not be extended to 
others. On this same basis, if there were ‘implicit limits’, the Court could invalidate the Civil 
War amendments, which were in direct contravention of such a decision. The solution to a bad 
amendment, according to Vile, is another one repealing it. 
While Vile’s arguments against implicit limits to amendment are largely valid, his 
conclusions about the Supreme Court’s role in amendatory change are not. Although not a part of 
America’s original constitutional history, the role of constitutional courts in ruling on 
amendments is central to constitutional stability. When there are unnameable provisions of a 
constitution, it invites the defender of that document, the judiciary, to rule on the legitimacy of 
future amendments. Obviously, any court is still constrained by public pressure, and would 
undermine constitutional stability dramatically if it were to rule against a widely-supported 
amendment, but rarely do controversial amendments receive such support. When there are 
unamendable provisions in a constitution that outline the fundamental goals, ideals, and/or 
institutions of that document, citizens are less likely to attempt to undermine those principles via 
amendment. Moreover, these unamendable provisions afford constitutional courts the ability to 
rule on amendment, something fundamental to countries that experience a productive rate of 
formal amendment.
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Consequently, America’s unique position as the first modern constitution resulted in it 
excluding explicit limits to amendments, in defence of future generations. The Founding Fathers 
were undertaking in an experiment, and to place unnecessary guard rails around such a process 
would be in their eyes erroneous. While the Framer’s logic, as well as Vile’s, is understandable, it 
appears that the crafters of modern constitutions do not completely agree. Instead, the trend in 
constitutional development across the world has been the inclusion of explicit unamendable 
provisions, with 40% of the constitutions currently in use having some form of 
unamendability.  While the American case is foundational in understanding the limits of 143
amendment, an analysis of other country’s unamendeability and the jurisprudence associated is 
necessary to fully understand the effects of these ‘eternity clauses’ and their relationship with 
constitutional stability. 
Section 2: Unamendability across the World
In his comprehensive work Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, Yaniv Roznai 
argues that there are few fundamental characteristics of unamendability across the world. The 
most common of these is unamendable clauses preservative function—that they are meant to 
cement some core constitutional values within the document. Preservative unamendable clauses 
reflect some ‘amendaphobia’ on the part of that constitution’s writers—they fear that the 
amendment process will be used to “abrogate the core values of society.”  Roznai uses the 144
metaphor of Ulysses and the sirens to illustrate these preservative clauses purpose, as they are 
meant to prevent the people of a nation from being called in a direction that would lead to their 
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constitutional demise.  Interestingly, these unamendable clauses have often been used to 145
entrench the rights of a monarch or family. For example, in the Albania Constitution of 1928, 
Article 50 states that “the King of the Albanians is his Majesty Zog I, of the illustrious Albanian 
family of Zogu” and that this Article cannot be amended.  Many Arab countries had or still 146
have similar protections for royal families. Nevertheless, the relationship between preservative 
unamendable clauses and constitutional stability is transparent—they permanently protect the 
“core values of a society” something fundamental to the functioning of any constitutional 
system. 
With the characteristics of preservative unamendable clauses established, it is beneficial 
to turn to a case study of the German Constitution, its ‘eternity clause’, the jurisprudence 
associated, and its effect on constitutional stability. The German Constitutional Court has 
established a jurisprudential basis to rule on ‘unconstitutional’ amendments, and its history 
provides an illustrative example as to unamendability and its effects. 
The history of Germany’s sixty-year-old Basic Law is an interesting one, with its 
normative roots being based in the failings of the Weimar Constitution. The Weimar Constitution 
had no ‘material limits’ on constitutional amendments.  Its amendment portion—Article 76—147
enabled the constitution’s amendment through the standard legislative process.  The argument 148
for such an easy amendment process was based in the fact that the Reichstag was viewed as both 
the legislature, and the constitution-making body. German politicians and theorists of the time 
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contended that the American Constitution was explicit in differentiating between legislative and 
‘constituent’ power, while the Weimar Constitution was not.  The contrast between the two 149
constitutions was often cited as the justification behind the Reichstag’s ability to make 
constitutional amendments.  150
This line of thinking was the mainstream understanding until the theorist Carl Schmitt 
presented a new train of thought. Schmitt argued that there were “material limits on 
constitutional amendments”, as “constitutional legislation … can substitute for individual or 
multiple [clauses] … only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the 
constitution as an entirety is preserved.”  Although vague, Schmitt used the example of 151
worker’s councils replacing democratic elections as the means with which representatives were 
chosen.  If the constitution was amended in such a manner, it would go against the 152
constitutional identity of the document, and is therefore illegitimate in the constitutional order.  153
For Schmitt, the fundamental values and principles of the constitution were the ‘true 
constitution,’ while the provisions that dealt with less consequential things were the 
‘constitutional laws’.  As a result, Schmitt believed that the Reichstag could only amend these 154
‘constitutional laws’.  155
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While this idea of constitutional identity was not the basis of the creation of Article 79.3, 
it eventually served as the rationale behind numerous German Constitutional Court decisions. 
Interestingly, the reasoning behind the eternity clause was even simpler. At the meeting of the 
Bonn Parliamentary Council in the months leading to the Basic Law’s adoption, future Minister 
of Justice Thomas Dehler argued that the inclusion of such a clause was necessary to “destroy a 
revolution’s mask of legitimacy.”  Years earlier, the Nazis had seized power utilizing the 156
Weimar Constitution’s emergency powers. Under this new constitution, Dehler hoped an 
abridgement of the constitution to the extent that Hitler pursued would be viewed as a 
transparent attack on the constitutional order. 
Dehler’s aims in preventing revolutionaries from gaining legitimacy reveal the necessity 
of including an eternity clause in any constitution. Moreover, Dehler’s argument is supported by 
modern empirical evidence from authors like Ginsburg and Huq. In their work How to Save a 
Constitutional Democracy, the authors delineate between two ways democracies fail, 
authoritarian collapse and democratic erosion. While authoritarian collapse is easy to identify—
as it is when a democracy collapses “completely and rapidly”—democratic erosion is much more 
sinister, involving  “a process of incremental … decay in … competitive elections, liberal rights 
to speech and association, and the rule of law.”  With this in mind, one of the central tools that 157
the authors identify as a means with which erosion occurs is the “the use of constitutional 
amendments to alter basic governance arrangements.”  In the world today, democratic erosion 158
is responsible for the transition of nations like Hungary, Turkey, and Poland into illiberal 
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democracies.  Using Freedom House’s index as the basis for their statistical analysis, Ginsburg 159
and Huq concluded that since 1972, only seven democracies have experienced ‘collapses’ while 
over 56 have experienced erosion.  Moreover, almost all of the nations that experienced a 160
collapse first had some form of erosion. As a result, Dehler’s argument seems increasingly 
rational—by including a provision that protects the underlying constitutional identity, those who 
would seek to erode the constitutional order through constitutional mechanisms are 
delegitimized. 
At the same time, as the prior chapter has argued, a productive amount of formal 
amendment promotes constitutional stability. However, if there are no unamendable provisions, 
and the amendment process is structured in a problematic manner, amendments that undermine 
constitutional stability can be passed. In this context, it is transparent as to the benefits of 
unamendable provisions in promoting constitutional stability by allowing for a constitutional 
court to rule against amendments that undermine the constitutional order. For an amendment 
process to effectively promote constitutional stability, it must allow for regular amendment, but it 
must also ensure these amendments to do not abrogate the constitutional order. 
With the normative justifications behind Germany’s unamendability established, it is now 
pertinent to focus on its effects on German constitutional jurisprudence. For German political 
theorists, there is an inextricable link between the concept of constitutional identity and the 
eternity clause. The “core of the constitution” is the document’s identity, and the clauses 
protected under Article 79.3 are what represent this “identity of the constitution.”  The 161
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delineation between the clauses protected under Article 79.3 and those outside of it serve as the 
legal framework with which the German Constitutional Court has separated constituent power 
from constituted power.  The ability of the legislature or court in changing the constitution—as 162
wielders of the constituted power—is bound by Article 79.3. Meanwhile, the constituent power, 
the capacity of the ‘German people’ to upend the constitutional order, can never be bound.  163
However, what an exercise of constituent power looks like is unclear, but in Schmitt’s eyes, it 
involved some governmental overthrow or revolution. Building on Schmitt’s beliefs, this idea 
was first articulated in modern German legal thought by Constitutional Court Judge Brun-Otto 
Bryde in 1982, when he argued that “constitutional amendments must preserve the identity and 
continuity of the constitution as a whole.”  Only the people, through some extra-constitutional 164
mechanism, can effect the constitutionally identity, as it is insulated by Article 79.3. 
While the concept of constitutional identity had been around for quite some time, it 
wasn’t cemented into German constitutional law until 2009, with the Lisbon case.  The case 165
examined the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon, an agreement that amended the 
foundational treaties of the European Union. The decision by the German Constitutional Court 
articulated many ideas, using Article 79.3 as the grounds. Specifically, the Court concluded that 
the constitutional identity of the Basic Law is codified by Article 79.3.  In line with this 166
thinking, any encroachment upon this article was “an encroachment upon the constituent power 
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of the people.”  Even though the amendment clause gives the legislature some constituted 167
power in changing the constitution, the Court contended that there is “no constitutional body” 
that has the power to change the general “constitutional principles which are essential … to 
Article 79.3 of the Basic Law.”  Consequently, the Court argued that only through “declared 168
will of the German people” could the constitutional state was abandoned.  And with no clear 169
manner by which there could be an expression of the “declared will of the German people,” the 
Court effectually made Article 79.3 the basis with which amendments could be ruled 
unconstitutional.
Constitutional identity and its protection through an eternity clause have proven to be 
beneficial to constitutional jurisprudence in Germany, but Article 79.3 has not yet been used as a 
means with which a constitutional amendment has been ruled illegitimate. However, the 
Constitutional Court has managed to use Article 79.3 to the lay the legal framework such that a 
future populist who seizes control over some democratic institutions in Germany would, unlike 
Hitler, have their “revolution’s mask of legitimacy [destroyed].”  170
Differently, the Colombian Supreme Court used this same idea of constitutional identity 
to prevent amendments it viewed as deleterious to the overall constitutional system, attempting 
to promote constitutional stability. While the Colombian example reveals a modern, practical 
implementation of what scholar John R. Vile feared—a Court invalidating amendments on 
implicit grounds, it proved vital to the country’s constitutional order. 
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The Colombian Constitution of 1991 has a rigid structure based on having a one-term 
president.  The President has the ability to appoint individuals to the Central Bank, the Judicial 171
Council, and the Constitutional Court.  As a result, if a President manages to have more than 172
one-term, they would be able to effectively undermine the constitutional identity of the document
—the underlying goals and principles of the constitution would be subverted if these institutions 
were co-opted by loyalists of one President. In 2005, Alvaro Uribe, a popular reformer had 
finished his first term.  Riding high in the polls, Uribe and his allies in Congress submitted and 173
passed a constitutional amendment to allow him to run for another term.  In Colombia, 174
constitutional amendments can be passed by Congress, a Constituent Assembly, or a 
referendum.  While the Constitutional Court is allowed to review these amendments, they can 175
only review them “for errors of procedure in their formation.”  With no eternity clause or 176
constitutional jurisprudence related to amendments, the Court was limited in preventing such an 
amendment. When a case was brought against the term-limit extension, the Court upheld the 
amendment as constitutional, but did contend that there was such a thing as an unconstitutional 
amendment—there were both substantive and procedural limits to what could be changed within 
the constitution.177
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 In 2010, at the end of his second term, Uribe tried once again to pass an amendment to 
seek a third term. However, this time, the Court “invalidated a law that called for a referendum 
on a constitutional amendment that would allow the president to run for a third term of office.”  178
The Court argued that the amendment “violate[d] a basic principle of democracy” as it would 
compromise the democratic institutions necessary to keep the constitutional order intact.  After 179
a few weeks of uncertainty, Uribe accepted the decision. In this context, the Court was lucky 
Uribe accepted the decision, as his actions had the guise of legitimacy that Dehler wanted to 
prevent. Had Uribe disagreed with the Court, he likely would have been successful in gaining a 
third-term, essentially destroying the Colombian Constitution’s identity. 
The Colombian example highlights how, without an eternity clause, a nation’s 
constitutional court is pressed in justifying why an amendment that undermines constitutional 
identity is illegitimate. If Colombia had an eternity clause in the mold of Germany’s, the Court 
would have felt more comfortable ruling against the term-limit extension the first time, as they 
would have valid constitutional and jurisprudential justifications behind their decision.  In this 
way, eternity clauses, and their effectiveness in identifying constitutional identity, can prove 
advantageous to any modern constitutional court when ruling on amendments. Similarly, the 
Colombian example highlights how an eternity clause would be beneficial in settling the legal 
debate that rages around implicit constitutional limits in America. If the American Constitution 
had an explicit clause like Germany’s Article 79.3, scholars like Wright and Murphy would have 
the textual grounds with which to base their arguments about amendatory limits. America may be 
a unique case because of its extremely low rate of amendment, but the German and Colombian 
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examples highlight how unamendable provisions play an important role in allowing 
constitutional courts to rule on amendments, promoting constitutional stability by protecting that 
document’s underlying identity.
The goal of this section was to highlight the ways in which amendment processes can be 
inherently limited as a feature of their construction. These limitations are normatively positive, 
and have a clear effect on constitutional jurisprudence—eternity clauses empower judges to more 
effectively play a role in the amendment process. Constitutions that include such eternity clauses 
invite their Supreme Courts to invalidate amendments that come into conflict with these 
‘permanent’ sections of the constitution. This is reflected in the extent to which constitutional 
courts across the world have played an active role in debating the constitutionality of their 
country’s amendments. In contrast, a nation like America, with only its Senate-apportionment 
eternity clause, has had its Court play a much smaller role in any discussion of amendment. 
While this is somewhat a consequence of America’s generally arduous amendment process, it is 
also a ramification of having no eternity clause that helps to elucidate America’s underlying 
constitutional identity. Interestingly, even if a country has no eternity clauses, constitutional 
courts can insert themselves into the amendment process as was witnessed in Colombia. With 
Colombia being the quintessential example, constitutional courts rarely insert themselves in any 
amendment process as it is the time at which democratic values are at their strongest—-
amendment processes more than any other electoral mechanism involve the entire populace of a 
country.  However, when courts do involve themselves in amendment processes, it is usually 180
 This is not always the case, as some amendment processes are extremely political elite-based, where the general 180
population does not play a role in amending their constitution, they just play a role in electing their politicians. This 
type of example, and its effects, will be found in the next section.
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because they feel the amendment upends the constitutional order to a degree that undermines the 
values within the constitution more generally. 
In summary, unnameable provisions are fundamental to any amendment procedure, and 
when properly crafted, promote constitutional stability. Not only do unamendable provisions 
permanently enshrine some values, ideals, or institutions within a constitution, but they also 
empower the constitutional court to invalidate amendments that would undermine constitutional 
stability. As the prior chapter had emphasized that the Supreme Court should not play as active a 
role in ‘informally amending’ the constitution, it was the goal of this chapter to highlight the 
proper avenue for judicial involvement in the amendment process. When an amendment process 
is crafted in a manner that promotes constitutional stability, with unamendable provisions and a 
populace comfortable with amendment, the ‘right’ amount of constitutional change is able to 
occur. 
With the normative arguments around amendment established, and the effects of eternity 
clauses on constitutional amendment processes elucidated, it is now time to turn our attention to 
amendment processes and their effects on constitutional stability. While amendment processes 
are just one piece of the overall constitutional puzzle, they influence the future of any 
constitution while informing the present. In turn, amendment processes provide a window into 
the philosophy of a country, their style of government, and the things that can be changed 
moving forward. As will be seen in the next chapter, not all amendment processes are created 
equal, and some promote constitutional stability better than others. 
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Chapter 3: Amendment Processes and their Effects
Amendment processes have an effect on the constitutional stability of the nations they 
govern, and it is the goal of this section to illustrate this relationship. However, before attention 
can be given to this endeavour, it is first important to establish and define the terms being 
analyzed. Amendment processes are the sections of a constitution that govern the ways in which 
that document can be amended. As will be shown in this section, there is a wide variety of ways 
to structure amendment procedures. However, one thing all amendment processes have in 
common is that they were created in pursuit of ensuring the permanence of the constitution they 
are a part of. The Founding Fathers of America may have been the first to create this mechanism 
for change, but the concept is now understood as a constitutional necessity. As was shown in 
Chapters 1 and 2, constitutional upkeep is important—constitutions must change with time and 
context. This is where the relationship between amendment processes and constitutional stability 
comes into play. In this paper ‘constitutional stability’ refers to the permanence of the underlying 
values and institutions found within a constitution. In no way is ‘constitutional stability’ meant to 
imply a lack of amendment. Instead, as this section will argue, all constitutions must change over 
time, and those that don’t—those with an extremely low rate of amendment—undermine 
constitutional stability, as institutions begin to break down and citizens come to view their 
constitution with low regard. At the same time, if a constitution changes too quickly and 
dramatically, it can undermine these democratic institutions in a different, but equally 
problematic way. 
Consequently, it is the goal of this section to illustrate the relationship between 
amendment processes and constitutional stability, revealing the effects of different amendment 
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processes on the countries they govern. Specifically, this section will analyze a few case studies, 
must notably the constitutional amendment processes of America, its states, and Eastern Europe. 
This analysis informs this thesis’ theory of amendatory change, which identifies four amendment 
process factors—the institutions involved, the level of difficulty, unamendability, and 
amendment culture—as consequential in effecting constitutional stability. Once this theory is 
outlined, it is then applied to America’s Article V process and historical developments, 
highlighting its applicability and import. 
Section 1: Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment
Analysis of amendment processes is a relatively novel endeavour in the world of legal 
research, with Donald Lutz’ 1994 Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment serving as the 
first formative work in this regard. As Lutz explains, the American amendment process was the 
first to institutionalize constitutional change and was based on the three important premises 
outlined in Chapter 1—“the imperfect but educable” nature of humans, the “importance of a 
deliberative process”,  and the “distinction between normal legislation and constitutional 
provisions.”  181
These premises reveal the extent to which the Founding Fathers valued democracy, an 
informed citizenry, and the constitution they created. However, based on these premises, the 
amendment procedure cannot be too easy or too hard. If the American Constitution was too easy 
to amend, there would not be a large enough distinction between normal legislation and 
constitutional matters. At the same time, another implication of an easy amendment process was 
 Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 181
(1994): pp. 355-370, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944709)
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that deliberative discussion of crafting amendments would be cut short. Differently, the Founding 
Fathers feared that a too-arduous amendment process would make their constitution static, 
disabling it from rectifying past mistakes or adjusting to new situations.  As was described in 182
Chapter 1, formal amendment is not the only way to change a constitution. Legislative revision 
and judicial interpretation are two common mechanisms through which governments are able to 
promote constitutional development. However, these three means of change reflect decreasing 
levels of popular participation. As a result, the formal amendment process is the one most in line 
with the Founding Fathers goals in creating America’s foundational document. In this way, 
amendment processes are often inherently ‘democratic’, involving the populace in the discussion 
of governmental structure to a degree not witnessed otherwise. Using the formal amendment 
process, rather than other avenues of constitutional revision, lends itself to constitutional stability 
and legitimacy.183
Consequently, America’s Founding Fathers created the first amendment process in the 
world, one which many countries have attempted to emulate and improve upon. In 1994, only 
4% of the world’s national constitutions lacked an amendment process, reflecting a global 
understanding of the importance of this type of constitutional provision.  This reality informed 184
a few of Donald Lutz’ assumptions about amendment processes more generally. Integral to Lutz’ 
eventual analysis, his first assumption is that every constitutional system needs to be changed at 
some point.  This necessity of change is a result of developments in demography, economics 185
morality, or even previously unseen institutional problems. When there are situations that 
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necessitate constitutional update, often the legislature, executive, and judiciary of a country 
cumulatively make these changes when there is no formal amendment. Lutz’ second assumption 
is that in a constitutional political system, changes to that system must be reflected in that 
country’s constitution, while Lutz’ third assumption, based on the prior two, is that all 
constitutions require regular, periodic change through some process.  186
Lutz’ assumptions inform his eventual metric for analysis, amendment rate. The 
amendment rate of any country is the average number of formal amendments passed per year 
after the constitution came into effect.  As Lutz argues, amendments are a normatively positive 187
good, as they mean the constitution is being taken ‘seriously'. As a result, a country should 
pursue an amendment rate that is ‘moderate’—people change their constitution when the context 
necessitates it. If the amendment rate is too slow—which for Lutz means the amendment process 
is too challenging—then extraconstitutional means will often be used to change the 
constitution.  This amendment rate has a direct relationship with constitutional ‘failure’—times 188
when a constitution was replaced with a completely new constitutional order. Lutz argues that 
this type of failure happens as a result of a large shift in a nation’s values and institutions, an 
insufficiency on the part of the constitution to keep up with the times, or a high level of 
constitutional revision such that the document is no longer the same.  Importantly, Lutz 189
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believes that a moderate rate of amendment would prevent these issues from occurring, such that 
countries with this effective level of change have longer lasting constitutional systems.  190
At first Lutz’ argument may seem simplistic, arguing that the failure of a country’s 
constitutional system is based integrally on its amendment process. However, analysis of the 
normative problems of associated with too high or too low amendment rate helps to support 
Lutz’ claim. When the amendment rate of a country is too low, there are necessary systemic 
changes that are either not occurring, or are occurring through other means like judicial revision. 
When a country regularly fails to use its amendment process for this constitutional upkeep, it 
leads to a level of skepticism on the part of the populace that the country is failing to meet its 
commitments to popular sovereignty. Public opinion polls about the Supreme Court in America 
reflect this reality, as citizens views have become increasingly negative, and America is a country 
with one of the lowest amendment rates in the world.  Moreover, the degree to which American 191
citizens feel alienated from constitutional discourse as a result of the Supreme Court’s constant 
interventions also supports the arguments behind the issues of a too slow amendment rate. 
Building on this, Lutz believes that countries with a low amendment rate and a high level of 
judicial review rely on their justices having a ‘living constitutionalist’ tendency, or else their 
constitutions will never be changed at all.  192
In contrast, a too high amendment is associated with another whole host of problems. A 
primary issue with too many amendments is that the constitution in question is likely no longer
—-or at least to a lesser degree—viewed as higher law.  The more frequently a country uses 193
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amendments, the less delineated normal legislation and constitutional matters are. At the same 
time, when there are lots of amendments in this way, it has appeared empirically that this is 
because the legislature of a country dominates the formal constitutional amendment process.  194
To support his normative claims about amendment processes, Lutz analyzed amendment 
patterns within America’s state constitutions. While the national American constitution has one 
of the lowest amendment rates in the world, the state constitutions are regularly updated and deal 
with a bevy of issues. State constitutions have had to address rapid urbanization, special 
interests, changing responsibilities, as well as tyranny from their legislatures. As a result, the 
state constitutions serve as an interesting tool through which Lutz develops his argument. 
From 1798-1991, the American Constitution was amended 26 times over 202 years—an 
amendment rate of 0.13 per year—while the state constitutions were amended 5845 times, over 
94 years, with around 117 amendments per state—an amendment rate of 1.23.  This reality 195
reveals one of Lutz more interesting conclusions, there is a direct, statistically significant 
relationship between the length of a constitution and its rate of amendment.  As the state 196
constitutions deal with much more governmental functions than the federal one, they are longer 
and in turn are amended more often. Lutz controlled for variables like geographical size, 
population, per capita income, and many other factors, but the relationship remained—the longer 
the document, the more it was amended.  63% of state-level amendments were related to things 197
like local government structure, state debt, and other local issues.  However, even with those 198
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excluded, the rate of amendment at the state level was 0.47, almost 3.5 times higher than the 
federal amendment rate.  If the goal of a constitution is to last, the least-permanent state 199
constitutions had the highest amendment rates, while the longest-lasting ones had a ‘moderate’ 
amendment rate.  200
Lutz state-level analysis led to many more interesting conclusions. At the state level, 
there are differences in who can initiate an amendment—the state legislature, initiative 
referendums, constitutional conventions, or commissions—but almost all of the amendments that 
eventually passed were initiated in the legislature.  States that had initiative processes often had 201
amendments that seemed beneficial theoretically but had critical issues from a practical 
standpoint.  Lutz believes that in some states, the initiative process made introducing 202
amendments too easy, while the harder it was for the legislature to propose amendments, the less 
there were.  It is important to note that there is a huge level of variety in these state 203
constitution’s amendment processes, especially in their guidelines around the legislature. Some 
states require multiple sessions of legislators to vote on the amendment, while others require 
varying degrees of supermajority.  These differences in amendment process have a direct effect 204
on amendment rate, and in turn inform constitutional stability. Lutz found that larger the required 
legislative majority in passing the amendment, the lower the amendment rate. However, 
requiring a legislature to pass a proposed amendment twice did not actually increase the 
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difficulty of the amendment process, as long as it was a simple majority that was required.  As 205
a result, the way to make an amendment process most challenging would be to “require the 
approval of two consecutive legislatures using a two-thirds majority each time” as was found in a 
minority of states.  Interestingly, Lutz concluded that having a popular referendum to approve a 206
legislature-initiated amendment is just as challenging as having the legislature approve their own 
amendment. 
Based on his analysis of constitutions across the world and within America, Lutz had four 
main conclusions. The first was that the amendment rate of a country can be explained by the 
length of their constitution and the difficulty of their amendment process.  Lutz’ second 207
observation was that a country can adjust these variables and have a predictable effect on their 
amendment rate.  Third, Lutz found that amendment rate has a direct relationship with 208
constitutional replacement, and the more moderate the rate of amendment, the longer a 
constitution lasts.  In this context, ‘moderate’ referred to a relatively average rate of 209
amendment in comparison with the other countries analyzed—such as the state level average of 
0.47. The countries that had relatively high or low rates of amendment were more likely to 
completely replace their constitution, reflecting an deterioration in constitutional stability. Lutz 
final point was that at a certain point, making the amendment process more difficult does not 
 Donald S. Lutz, (1994): pg 366205
 Ibid. pg 367206
 Ibid.207
 Ibid.208
 Ibid.209
 69
decrease the rate of amendment—-its better to avoid an extreme process and have a relatively 
short document.  210
Lutz statistical analysis of America’s state constitutions and their amendment processes 
supported his conclusions about their effect. Amendment processes, with their varying level of 
difficulty, allow a country or state to have a certain amendment rate. This rate of amendment is 
integral to a country’s constitutional order, and if this rate is too high or low, it can undermine the 
constitutional stability of that nation. When the amendment rate is too low or high, citizens begin 
to question their constitution and come to view it in contempt—this is why constitutional 
systems break down. As a result, it is fundamental that a constitution’s amendment process 
promote a moderate amendment rate, as this allows for constitutional stability. 
While Lutz arguments remain largely valid to this day, some modern scholars have 
disagreed with his assessment. In their work, Does the constitutional amendment rule matter at 
all? Tom Ginsburg and James Melton paint a different picture of the effects of amendment 
processes in creating a certain amendment rate. While Ginsburg and Melton agree that “it might 
be advisable to draft constitutions that have more flexible amendment provisions so as to allow 
for more formal change” they disagree with Lutz about the extent to which an amendment 
process solely informs amendment rate.  Ginsburg et al instead argue that the forces of supply 211
and demand govern constitutional amendment rate, and the amendment process is just one part 
of this scheme. On the demand side, Ginsburg et al believe that the degree to which the 
constitution is out of sync with society and the rate of social change inform the extent to which a 
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country’s citizenry and institutions ‘demand’ constitutional revision.  On the supply side, 212
Ginsburg views the formal structure of the amendment process as one variable, but the 
‘amendment culture’ of a nation as the other integral factor that informs the rate of 
amendment.  While all these elements influence the rate of amendment, Ginsburg et al view a 213
nation’s ‘amendment culture’ as most formative. 
For Ginsburg, amendment culture is the set of attitudes a citizenry holds in regards to the 
concept of amendatory change.  This amendment culture is independent of the issue that is 214
actually being addressed by any given amendment. At the same time, amendment culture is 
separate from the other contextual and societal factors that are creating the demand for 
amendatory change. Instead, amendment culture is the “baseline level of resistance to formal 
constitutional change” in a society.  As this baseline goes up, the “viscosity” of the amendment 215
process decreases, meaning that there is less amendatory change.  Ginsburg believes that a 216
nation’s amendment culture is informed in a variety of ways. One example is found in countries 
like New Zealand, and Israel, which have a high degree of amendatory change. In these 
countries, the ‘barriers’ to constitutional change are political rather than institutional.  Israel has 217
a relatively easy amendment process, and has no eternity clauses.  As a result, it is only 218
“cultural barrier[s]” that prevent a “complete revision of the rules” where partisan interests can 
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take control of the constitution.  In a country like Israel, the amendment culture creates a larger 219
‘supply’ for amendatory change, as the citizens are comfortable with and understand the 
importance amendments, yet would still oppose amendments that undermine the overall 
constitutional order. In contrast, in a country like America, there are arduous institutional 
boundaries that often prevent amendment. In turn, the populace of America has an amendment 
culture that further ‘decreases the supply’ of amendatory change—Americans view their 
constitution as a scared text, giving the entire document a level of normative significance that 
other countries don’t. Due to this reverence and seeming infallibility of the American 
Constitution, the American people have an amendment culture that reduces their level of 
amendment. While amendment cultures can change with time, this is usually only in contexts 
where a country is going through a period of huge upheaval, as was evidenced by the pro-
amendment culture found in America after the Civil War. 
Ginsburg eventually uses statistical analysis to conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between amendment culture and amendment rate, with amendment culture having a 
large effect. In contrast, Ginsburg’s data-set—which assessed constitutions in use across the 
world—revealed that amendment processes themselves had a much more minute effect in this 
context.  Ginsburg concludes that “[amendment processes] are not the primary determinant of 220
amendment rates” and that “amendment culture exists and is important” in this context.  221
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However, Ginsburg acknowledges that “amendment culture is shaped by [amendment 
processes.]”  222
While Ginsburg’s analysis and conclusions seemingly invalidate Lutz’, they actually 
build on and support them. Lutz and Ginsburg agree about the demand side factors, but Lutz fails 
to account for amendment culture and its effects. However, even Ginsburg acknowledges that 
amendment culture is largely informed by the amendment process that governs that country’s 
constitution, as well as any unamendable provisions within the constitution. As a result, 
amendment processes are still most consequential in informing a constitution’s rate of 
amendment, as the level of difficulty associated, the institutions involved, and its unamendability 
create the amendment culture of that nation. For example, America’s constitution, with its 
extremely arduous amendment rate, created a culture that viewed the document with a high level 
of reverence. In contrast, Germany’s constitution, with its easier amendment process and eternity 
clauses, facilitated an amendment culture that was pro-amendatory change. In this way, 
Ginsburg’s work helps to highlight just how large of an effect formal amendment processes have 
on the rate of amendment and the constitutional stability of nations more generally. Amendment 
processes inform amendment culture, amendment processes and culture create the rate of 
amendatory change, and the amendment rate has a direct effect on constitutional stability. 
Moreover, amendment processes—including unamendable provisions—influence the 
substance of amendments. The difficulty of an amendment process informs the content of 
amendments as political actors will only promote those they think can be ratified. In a country 
with extreme supermajoritarian requirements like America, the only amendments that are ever 
proposed are those that are seemingly unanimous. Differently, in a country like New Zealand 
T. Ginsburg and J. Melton, (2015) pg 700222
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with its relatively easy amendment process, citizens are more comfortable promoting 
amendments that require debate. At the same time, eternity clauses exclude whole facets of 
subject matter from ever being debated, influencing the substance of amendments greatly. 
Consequently, amendment procedures not only facilitate a certain amendment culture and 
amendment rate, which effect constitutional stability, but they also regulate the content of 
amendments. As some amendments can undermine constitutional stability and others can 
reinforce it, this effect is important and will be analyzed in greater detail later on. However, what 
can be concluded based off of the prior analysis is that amendment procedures have an important 
and direct relationship with constitutional stability.   
Section 2: Amendment Processes Across the World
The goal of the prior part of this chapter was to establish the relationship between 
amendment processes and constitutional stability. As a result, this portion will now look to 
analyze various constitutional amendment processes across the world, deducing some of their 
normative and empirical effects. In doing so, this paper seeks to reveal how some amendment 
processes are better than others in pursuit of the goal of constitutional stability. 
Generally, scholars group ‘amendment strategies’ into four main categories. The first are 
amendment processes that are based in legislative supremacy. In these countries, the legislature 
can amend the constitution via a vote. Countries with legislative supremacy over the amendment 
process usually view their constitution as more of a code-of-law rather than a higher-
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document.  At the same time, these documents are usually long and regularly updated.  The 223 224
quintessential example is New Zealand. Like many other common-wealth countries, New 
Zealand has no single constitutional document, and instead has a myriad of documents that 
together amount to their constitution. As a result of their amendment procedure, the amendment 
culture in New Zealand is one that is comfortable with amendment. In turn, New Zealand has 
one of the highest rates of amendment in the world, but not to a problematic degree.  As this 225
thesis has argued, New Zealand may be a functioning democracy, but it faces the same threats 
any country with too high an amendment rate would. New Zealanders have a very low level of 
constitutional reverence, and only have political barriers to problematic constitutional change. As 
a result,  New Zealand may face future threats to their constitutional order. However, as is 
evidenced by the case of New Zealand, too high an amendment rate can be less troublesome than 
too low of one. 
Another facet of these ‘legislative supremacist’ amendment processes is intervening 
election provisions. Many constitutions, like that of Finland and other Scandinavian countries, 
require that legislatures must vote on an amendment twice.  In Finland, one legislature introduces 
an amendment, and the subsequent legislature must vote in favour of this amendment with a 
2/3rds majority.  Normatively, countries with these mechanisms value more deliberation in 226
regards to constitutional amendment, and draw a bigger distinction between normal legislation 
and constitutional matters. Importantly, the citizens of these countries can influence the 
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amendment process via the election. In this way, these intervening election procedures allow for 
a level of involvement that the purely legislative supremacist processes do not. Ginsburg’s 
analysis revealed that the intervening election clauses lead to a lower amendment rate, but likely 
in a positive way—the amendment rate of countries with this type of mechanism can be 
described as ‘moderate,’ promoting permanence. 
Already, the relationship between amendment procedure and amendment culture is clear. 
In countries like Finland with a legislative, intervening election procedure, the populace has an 
opportunity to play a role in constitutional matters, using their vote as a means to voice their 
stance on a given amendment. As a result, the amendment culture in Finland would be one that is 
conducive to amendatory change—the citizenry supports and understands the necessity of 
amendment. At the same time, as a result of the legislature being the only avenue with which 
constitutional change can occur, citizens don’t have a problematic penchant for amendment—the 
Finnish people usually don’t even play a role in promoting these amendments in the first place. 
Another form of amendment procedure is described as the ‘multiple path’ mechanism. In 
these countries, the constitution can be amended via different means with differing difficulty. For 
example, amendments may require a legislative majority, a president or other political actor to 
call for a referendum, or a number of subnational governments to approve of an amendment. For 
example, Serbia’s constitution allows amendments to be proposed “by at least on third of 
deputies in the National assembly, by the president of the republic, by the government, or by 
petition of at least 150,000 voters.”  While the amendments still must be ratified through other 227
 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Section IX227
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constitutional mechanisms, the enabling of different avenues of proposal has helped Serbia to 
have an active amendment culture and a beneficial amendment rate.  228
The third common amendment mechanism found within country and state constitutions is 
to require a referendum. In Lutz’ study, he found that countries with a referendum had, on 
average, 1/20th of the amendment rate of those with legislative supremacy mechanisms.  As 229
has been expressed repeatedly, this likely means these countries have a ‘too low’ rate of 
amendment, and this rate undermines their constitutional stability. 
The final common amendment process is that which has ‘substantive variation’—
depending on the subject matter the amendment pertains to, it has differing degrees of difficulty. 
To return to the Serbian Constitution, proposed amendments have different means of ratification, 
with standard amendments needing a 2/3rds majority vote in the assembly, while those pertaining 
to the preamble, constitutional principles, and freedoms requiring a simple majority vote via 
referendum.  This type of proecdure is somewhat uncommon, but helps to establish a 230
constitution’s identity in the same way unamendable clauses do. In turn, this procedure creates an 
amendment culture that is open to change on less consequential matters, while understanding the 
gravity of amendments that go through the more arduous process. 
In Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective Professor Rosalind 
Dixon sought to build on Lutz’ analysis, using modern statistical tools to deduce the relationships 
between amendment rate and the aforementioned amendment procedures, revealing their 
empirical effect. While Lutz found a clear negative correlation between “the difficulty of 
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amendment and the actual amendment rate” his data-set failed to effectively differentiate 
between procedures to the degree that Dixon’s did.  As a result, Dixon’s work highlights the 231
actual ‘difficulty’ associated with different amendment procedures. Most fundamental, Dixon 
discovered that supermajority legislative requirements reduced the rate of amendment more than 
any other factor.  Interestingly, Dixon also found that there was a statistically significant, 232
positive relationship between popular initiative and the overall rate of amendment.  This 233
conclusion supports Ginsburg concept of amendment culture and the relationship it has to 
amendment procedure. When a country’s citizens are able to propose their own amendments, 
they are supportive of amendatory change such that it occurs more frequently. At the same time 
Dixon also discovered that the double-passage and single-subject requirements did not have a 
statistically significant relationship with amendment rate.  While this reality may be a result of 234
some sections of a constitution being regularly amended while others are not, it reveals a failure 
of the normative goal of some constitutional framers in creating content-specific amendment 
procedures. 
One of the most important facets of Dixon’s work was her discovery amendatory ‘path 
dependence.’ If a country amended their constitution in a given year, they were 2.8 times more 
likely to amend it two years later, and 1.8 times more likely to do so again four years after 
that.  The ‘path dependence’ Dixon identified supports Ginsburg’s conclusions about 235
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amendment culture. Countries with a culture that is supportive of amendatory change regularly 
experience it. The normative reasoning behind this is simple, the more a citizenry amends their 
constitution, the more legitimacy they think amendatory change has. The inverse is also true, as 
is evidenced by the amendment culture in America and the dearth in amendments found in its 
Constitution. Dixon’s empirical work helped to identify the actual, rather than normative, 
difficulty associated with amendment procedures across the world. While Dixon’s goal was not 
to deduce whether these procedures effected constitutional stability, her work lends itself to the 
analytical goal of this paper, helping to give empirical weight to the claims that follow. 
This chapter has established the relationship between amendment procedure and 
constitutional stability, as well as the high level of variation across the world in regards to 
amendment procedure more generally. At the same time, this chapter highlighted the common 
empirical conclusions in the amendment procedure field. The implication of these conclusions is 
that a country’s amendment procedure is a factor that effects constitutional stability, and that 
some country’s have better mechanisms than others in pursuit of this end. Consequently, the rest 
of this thesis focuses on amendment procedures across the world, analyzing their direct effects 
on constitutional stability to try and help elucidate this relationship. Specifically, this paper will 
analyze the unique case of Eastern Europe after the Cold War, comparing the normative goals 
behind these constitutions’ amendment procedures with their effects on constitutional stability in 
the region today. Eastern Europe is a unique case for analysis as the post-Soviet countries had 
none of their own democratic history to turn to as a basis for the creation of their amendment 
procedures. As a result, these processes were made with the specific goal of constitutional 
stability, and the successes and failures of many of these countries helps to reveal which of these 
constitutional mechanisms was most effective in promoting this end. This chapter has defined 
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key terms like constitutional identity, democratic stability, amendment rate, and amendment 
culture. These terms will be used in the subsequent section to help support the claims made about 
Eastern European democracy and the constitutional amendment processes that govern it. 
Section 2: Amendment Procedures in Eastern Europe
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the top legal minds of the world descended on Eastern 
Europe to help craft the constitutions that would eventually come to govern these nascent 
nations. Interestingly, scholars like Cass Sunstein made normative claims as to the best structure 
of these constitutions, especially in regards to things like amendment procedures. As a result, the 
goal of this portion of the chapter is to outline the constitutional history of Eastern Europe as 
well as the views of Sunstein on the effectiveness of their amendment structures. Interestingly, 
two countries, Bulgaria and Hungary, adopted completely disparate amendment procedures. 
Bulgaria utilized a relatively stringent amendment process that promoted a moderate rate of 
amendment, as well as amendments that substantively supported the constitutional order. As a 
result, Bulgaria’s amendment procedure serves as the quintessential Eastern European example 
of a process that encourages constitutional stability. In contrast, Hungary’s amendment process 
was overly facile, fostering a problematic amendment culture, too high a rate of amendment, and 
amendments that substantively undermined constitutional stability. While the effects of these 
Eastern European countries’ amendment procedures cannot be completely generalized to all 
other contexts, they highlight the important effect of amendment processes on constitutional 
stability. Hungary and Bulgaria seemingly should be on the same constitutional path, yet 
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Hungary has undermined stability, while Bulgaria has promoted it. This reality is at least in part a 
consequence of their different amendment procedures.  
Before delving further into the history of Eastern Europe, it is first pertinent to clarify 
central terms and the frame of this analysis. Sunstein’s formative paper The Politics of 
Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, describes the theoretical underpinnings behind the 
constitutional design of Eastern European democracies.  Interestingly, Sunstein made claims as 236
to what amendment procedure would be best given the unique history of these countries. In this 
regard,  the end Sunstein’s pursues is constitutional stability, as is this papers. Constitutional 
stability in this context refers to the permanence of a constitutional order—citizens must have 
respect for the document’s institutions and values, the government must have respect for these 
same principles, and the government must be made up of these institutions.  The modern political 
term democratic backsliding encapsulates the ways in which democracies fail in this regard—by 
comparing the degree to which these nations have experienced this de-democratization, the 
relative level of constitutional stability can be deduced. However, almost all nations experience 
some form of democratic backsliding at some point or another, so how can this undermining of 
constitutional stability be associated with amendment procedures? To try and tease out the 
relationship between amendment procedures and their effect on constitutional stability, this 
section analyzes the amendments passed in Bulgaria and Hungary after their founding, deducing 
which ones normatively lead to democratic backsliding. While one cannot afford all blame or 
praise to an amendment procedure in promoting a constitutional order, by analyzing countries 
with a similar geography and constitutional history, the differences in their development 
associated with amendment procedure—if any—can be revealed. 
 Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, “Twelve. The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern 236
Europe,” Responding to Imperfection, 1995, pp. 275-306, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821631.275)
 81
Amendment procedures are integral to a constitution because they allow for the revision 
of the laws that govern the laws. This was especially pertinent in Eastern Europe after the Cold 
War, as these countries had no constitutional history, and would likely need to update their 
constitutions to deal with issues they hadn’t foreseen when writing them. As a result, when 
scholars were debating what these constitutions should look like, many placed a greater emphasis 
on amendment process than in other constitution-making circumstances. As Sunstein explained, 
this amending power could end up “color[ing] the political process as a whole.”  Sunstein had a 237
concrete view that there was a best procedure in this context, based on the unique history of 
Eastern Europe. Specifically, Sunstein argued that there must be “relatively lax conditions for 
amendment,” the “unamendable provisions [must be kept] to a minimal core of basic rights and 
institutions,” the “process [should] be monopolized by parliament,” and there should be no 
“obligatory recourse to popular referenda.”  238
Sunstein’s beliefs about this type of process were based in his view that the Eastern 
European constitutions must allow for swift “channeled adjustments” in the face of “changing 
circumstances, without undermining the already weak legitimacy of democratically accountable 
assemblies.”  Sunstein believed that the citizens of Eastern Europe had a weak understanding 239
of democratic principles, and to complicate the amendment process by allowing for referendum 
or other means of amendment could hurt the already suspect newly-elected democratic 
governments. At the same time, these nations had no judiciaries that could serve as a check on 
this amending power. As a result, Sunstein acknowledges that in a more ‘democratic’ context, a 
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sharper split “between constitutional law and ordinary law would be preferable” but because of 
the “peculiar conditions of Eastern Europe” the amendment procedure must be structured this 
way.  240
Importantly, Sunstein believed that the Eastern European legislatures needed a relatively 
easy amendment procedure as undemocratic leaders can benefit from stringent ones.  If 241
amendments are difficult, especially in a context where democracy has been thrust upon the 
nation by foreign powers, the legislature has an excuse as to why they haven’t given in to the 
constitutional demands of the electorate. Similarly, in these contexts, the courts “will gain 
prestige because [they] can pose as the guardian of the ark of the covenant.”  Flexible 242
constitutional interpretation “diminishes the pressure for frequent amendment” which leads to an 
overemphasis on the importance of the constitutional court.  While this may not be problematic 243
in a country like America, with its unique, lengthy judicial history, it could definitely lead to 
issues in Eastern Europe. Sunstein’s conclusion was that  “stringent amending formulas will 
allow parliaments faced with large social problems to deflect social disapprobation and to escape 
democratic accountability in difficult times.”  244
Sunstein’s arguments are pertinent to take up, as he pursued the same goal as this thesis—
a presentation of the effect of amendment procedures on constitutional stability. However, 
Sunstein’s arguments are wholly theoretical and were made decades ago. As a result, the 
accuracy of the claims made throughout this thesis as well as Sunstein’s can be tested through the 
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analysis of these Eastern European countries and their constitutional development since 
becoming democracies. While Sunstein’s views are quite contrary to those of this thesis, his 
understanding of the consequential effect of amendment procedures, is not. As a result, 
Sunstein’s work is a great complement to this chapter, allowing for scholarly debate with another 
author. 
With Sunstein’s normative claims about what amendment procedure would be best in 
Eastern Europe established, it is now integral to explain the unprecedented constitutional history 
of Eastern Europe. By 1991, the communist system had collapsed in Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechslovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and the 
Ukraine.  Interestingly, the first act of these new regimes was constitutional amendment. 245
Almost all of these countries’ governments removed the clauses that “stipulat[ed] the leading role 
of the Communist Party.” As Sunstein describes, the greatest “political transformation of this 246
century was decorated by, or embodied in, constitutional amendments.”  The new Eastern 247
European leaders used the amendment power strategically “to … promote social change”—
instead of overthrowing the old order it was “simply negotiated and codified away.”  This effort 248
on the part of democratic forces in these countries was meant to symbolize how these actors 
preferred a non-revolutionary mechanism for political change.  As a result of this effort, “future 249
transformation” would be “legal, public and nonviolent.”250
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While the Eastern Europeans used amendatory change to help establish their countries, 
they “lack[ed] a firm constitutional tradition.”  As a result, the difference between 251
constitutional matters—what Ackerman referred to as Higher Lawmaking—and legal matters 
was obscured. Unlike the citizens of America, the denizens of Eastern Europe had no experience 
with constitutional law serving as the ‘guard rails' for ordinary law. This obfuscation is extremely 
problematic. If the citizens of Eastern Europe did not ‘respect’ and follow their constitutions, 
their constitutional orders would lack stability. This reality was caused by a few factors, namely 
that Eastern Europe had no “myth of the framers.”  The Eastern European political leaders of 252
the 1990s were the same as those who had made the constitution a few years earlier.  As a 253
result, there was no opportunity for the level of reverence seen in America, or across the world 
more generally.  
At the same time, the constitutional bargains between political actors at the time of these 
countries’ establishment were based on faulty information. For example, the powers of the 
presidency in Poland and Hungary were limited, based on a false assumption as to who would 
eventually occupy the position.  When Arpad Goncz, the leader of Hungary’s Liberal 254
opposition, became president, he was restricted constitutionally by constraints his own party 
created when they had believed his rival, Imre Pozsgay, was going to be elected.  In this 255
context, it is understandable why liberal leaders would want to amend their constitutions 
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immediately, as it is hard to respect the terms of deals that were made for strategic reasons that 
no longer provide any benefit.  
Moreover, as is a necessity of any constitution, it must change with circumstance. At the 
time of their constitutional creation, Eastern Europe was experiencing a level of tumult it had 
never seen prior, and it would be impossible for those countries leaders—or Sunstein for that 
matter—to have the foresight to deduce what would be the perfect democratic system for these 
countries. To complicate matters further, the newly-elected legislatures of these countries had 
“weak legitimacy and internal fragmentation.”  Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the parties 256
of Eastern Europe were united against the old regime. However, now with control over their own 
countries, these legislatures were marked by shifting alliances with no clear party in charge—in 
this situation, it is challenging to “create a constitutional framework that earns general 
respect.”  257
Consequently, the only certainty these constitutional framers had was future instability. 
The combination of the aforementioned historical factors and an uncertain future lead to a 
question as to what is the “optimal balance of constitutional rigidity and flexibility in such 
circumstances.”  Unlike Sunstein, the vast majority of Western observers criticized the idea of 258
allowing for a flexible amendment procedure in Eastern Europe. Generally, these observers 
contended that there would be no delineation between constitutional politics and ordinary 
politics. Instead, if these countries were governed by stringent constitutional arrangements that 
protected liberal rights, democratic processes, and economic prosperity, they would be insulated 
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from future democratic backsliding.  Most of these Westerners believed that because these 259
circumstances were changing so quickly, it could be more beneficial to have a stable constitution, 
promoting democracy in the long-term. 
To place Sunstein and the Western constitutional scholars in the terms this paper has been 
using thus far, Sunstein believed that the Eastern European countries, due to their unique history, 
would require a relatively high amendment rate in their first years. Sunstein believed that these 
circumstances created a high demand for amendatory change, yet this demand would only be met 
if there was a facile amendment procedure. At the same time, as has been explained, amendment 
processes have a direct effect on the amendment culture of any nation. If the amendment process 
was too rigid, the Eastern European citizenry would come to understand amendatory change as a 
normatively negative thing as it is sometimes viewed in America. If there was no positive 
amendment culture in Eastern Europe, as well as an arduous amendment process, the demand for 
amendatory change would have to be achieved by other institutions. However, at this time, the 
Eastern European countries had no real functioning judiciaries and weak, unreliable legislatures. 
As a result, it would be unlikely that the changes necessary to keep their constitutions 
functioning would occur from institutions outside the formal amendment procedure. When there 
is a high demand for amendment as a result of social, political, and economic factors, but no 
amendatory change occurs, the constitutional systems break down. Citizens come to view their 
constitutions with contempt, as well as the democratic institutions they create. Differently, the 
Western scholars believed that a high-level of amendment would lead to a whole-sale revision of 
Eastern Europe’s new constitutional order, leading to the type of democratic backsliding 
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witnessed elsewhere. The debate was centred around which amendment process was the lesser 
evil. 
Before turning our attention to the actual amendment procedures that were enacted, it is 
first important to analyze the effects of the ‘parliamentization’ of constitution making. As 
Sunstein, and his critics, identified, the issues associated with parliamentary control over the 
amendment process cannot be overstated. When the legislatures have completed control over the 
amendment procedure, it can lead to “legislative deadlocks, interest group pressures, short-term 
goal prioritization, and myopic bargains,” all of which contribute to substantively problematic 
amendments.  However, in Sunstein’s view, the benefits of such a system outweigh the 260
detriments. The countries of Eastern Europe still had to answer fundamental political questions 
as to what their democratic systems would look like—would they be unicameral or bicameral? 
Would these systems have proportional representation or single member districts? With no 
satisfying answer, Sunstein argued it is favourable to allow citizens and representatives to debate, 
learn about, and respond to these constitutional conundrums without undermining the one, 
somewhat functioning institution they have—the legislature. 
Before it is possible to analyze the effects of these amendment procedures as well as the 
accuracy of Sunstein’s normative claims, it is now pertinent to outline and explain the 
amendment formulas adopted across Eastern Europe. While these procedures had many 
commonalities, there were also pronounced differences in the amendment mechanisms each 
country adopted. After a survey of trends within the Eastern European amendment procedures 
more generally, the formulas of Bulgaria and Hungary will be analyzed in detail. Uniquely, these 
two countries have disparate amending formulas, with Hungary adopting a scheme similar to the 
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one Sunstein advocated for, while Bulgaria created one of the most stringent amending formulas 
in the region. As a result, these two countries will be used as case studies, with the amendments 
passed to this day serving as the metric for analysis. By looking at the amendments these nations 
have passed, and their effects on constitutional stability, the relationship between these two 
variables can be shown, and Sunstein’s claims can be supported or invalidated. 
Interestingly, as was covered in Chapter 2, three Eastern European countries included 
‘unamendable’ provisions within their constitution—Romania, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic
—which would assumedly help establish a constitutional identity.  The Constitution of Romania 
prohibits amendments from changing the “national, unitary, and indivisible character of the 
Romanian state, the Republican form of government, territorial integrity, independence of the 
judiciary, [and] political pluralism.  In a more pithy manner, the Constitution of the Czech 261
Republic stipulates that “any changes in the essential requirements for a democratic state 
governed by rule of law are impermissible.”  It would be a normative conclusion of this paper 262
that these countries have relatively stronger judiciaries than those who do not have these same 
unamendable clauses, as their justices are able to invalidate amendments on the grounds that they 
infringe upon constitutional identity. At the same time, this unamendability would seemingly 
lead to an amendment culture that is supportive of amendments, except those that infringe upon 
the constitutional identity outlined in these clauses. As was explained in Chapter 2, these 
unamendable provisions strengthen the role of the judiciary in the amendment process, enabling 
them to have the jurisprudential clout to invalidate amendments. As a result, it is a normative 
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claim of this paper that countries with unamendable provisions related to their amendment 
procedure experience a greater degree of constitutional stability. 
In regards to the question of “who wields the amending power,” it seems there were four 
main answers adopted by the Eastern European countries. A few countries granted exclusive 
amending power to their legislatures—the Hungarian Parliament, the Polish Sejm, and the Czech 
Parliament.  Some countries, most notably Macedonia, granted the legislature the power to 263
amend, but also give access to other institutions.   The Constitution of Macedonia specifies that 264
only the Assembly can ratify amendments, but the President, government, 30 members of the 
assembly, or a petition of 150,000 Macedonians can lead to an amendment proposal.  Uniquely, 265
the Constitution of Romania gives no institution unilateral amendment power. As a result of 
Romania’s amendment formula, the legislature is unable to approve amendments, and instead 
proposed amendments must be voted on via referenda.  The inclusion of the referendum 266
mechanism is what led Sunstein to conclude that Romania has “the weakest parliament in 
Eastern Europe.”  Differently, many of these countries gave their legislatures the ability to 267
amend, but did not make it exclusive. Countries like the Ukraine, Slovakia, and Latvia allowed 
for popular referendums on amendments in certain contexts, as well as public petitions.  In 268
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some of these countries, the inclusion of the populace in voting on amendments is dependent on 
a decision from their President or their legislature, as is seen in Croatia and Slovenia.269
Importantly, allowing more institutions to play a role in the amendment process promotes 
constitutional stability. By forcing different constitutionally-created institutions to deliberate with 
each other in the creation of amendments, it ensures that none of these institutions is undermined 
by any given amendment. In turn, the constitutional balance of power remains intact, promoting 
stability. In contrast, when one institution—like the legislature—has complete control over the 
amendment process, the amendments will likely empower that institution, or at the least not 
undermine it. As a result, when one institution wields the power of amendment, amendments are 
more likely to substantively undermine other constitutional institutions. This effect has been seen 
in countries like Hungary, where its legislature wields sole amendatory power and other 
democratic institutions have been undermined.  270
Differently, referendums often have a pronounced muting effect on amendment rate. 
When countries must use a national referendum to pass amendment, it makes nuanced 
constitutional questions public political debates. While this ensures a higher level of deliberation, 
this discussion is often distilled into what citizens can digest and is passed on that basis, rather 
than on the grounds of the substance of the amendment itself. For example, had Bulgaria 
included a referendum mechanism within its amendment procedure, its EU-based reforms to its 
judiciary may not have been able to be passed. The political talking points against the 
amendments—that the EU is seizing power through unelected judges—-would be too potent 
when the counter-argument is a nuanced point about how the judiciary should be structured. As a 
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result, national referendums not only have an empirical effect, negative relationship with 
amendment rate—as Lutz and others identified—but they also effect the substance of 
amendments in a way that could undermine constitutional stability. While citizens should be 
involved in constitutional discussions, sometimes amendments need to be ‘in the weeds’—-
especially in the context of institutional upkeep in Eastern Europe—and are tough to 
comprehend for the average person. When a country is small and old, like Switzerland, national 
referendums can have a positive effect insofar as they involve the whole populace in promoting 
constitutional stability, and the amendments require less institutional nuance. However, in most 
contexts, national referendum mechanisms within amendment procedures undermine 
constitutional stability. 
Another feature of the Eastern European amendment procedures was time constraints. 
The Constitution of Estonia requires that any amendment proposal must go through three 
separate reading periods each a month a part.  Similarly, the Constitution of Latvia necessitates 271
that three separate ballots occur for each amendment.  The goal of these constraints are clear—272
the Eastern European constitutional crafters wanted to ensure that before any amendment passed, 
there was a deliberative process. Interestingly, time constraints provide a potent institutional 
safeguard against substantively problematic amendments. If a hostile legislature is trying to seize 
constitutional control via amendatory change, time constraints afford the opposition an 
opportunity to rally against the amendment. Even if it only provides an extra month, week, or 
day, deliberation in the context of amendment is important, as is allowing for criticisms of an 
amendment’s design. As a result, time constraints promote constitutional stability, albeit in an 
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obfuscated manner, by affording the opposition to any amendment an opportunity to argue 
against it. If an amendment is really beneficial to constitutional stability, it will pass, even if it 
must be voted on multiple times on different days. In contrast, problematic amendments that 
undermine constitutional stability will be less likely to pass. 
Interestingly, the Hungarian amendment procedure is exemplar insofar as it follows the 
principles Sunstein advocated for. The legislature of Hungary has exclusive power over 
constitutional revision, although there are some procedural constraints. Hungary’s constitution 
begins with a “declaration of temporariness,” a constitutional acknowledgement that 
foreshadows its eventual developments.  The creators of the Hungarian constitution understood 273
the context in which they were forming a government, and agreed with Sunstein in the necessity 
of amendatory change moving forward. Article 24 Section 3 of the Constitution of Hungary 
specifies that the for amendments to be valid, they must receive an “affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the Members of Parliament.”   However, unlike some of the other constitutions 274
described prior, the Hungarian parliament is the sole wielder of amendatory power. As a result, 
the Hungarian parliament can “unilaterally revise the constitution” and ensure that “no 
amendment [is] … enacted without [their] approval.”  While Sunstein would laud this 275
amendment procedure for understanding the unique situation Eastern European democracies are 
in, it fails to take into account the possible negative ramifications associated with such 
concentrated power. 
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Differently, the Bulgarian National Assembly has the power to amend their constitution 
on their own, but the procedure is quite arduous. As Sections 153, 154, 155 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution outline, “constitutional amendment[s] … require a majority of 3/4ths of the votes all 
members of the National Assembly on three ballots on three different days.”  At the same time, 276
“amendment bills [are] debated by the National Assembly not earlier than one month and not 
later than three months from the date on which it is introduced.”  Bulgaria had the most 277
stringent amendment procedure in all of Eastern Europe at the time of its founding, leading to 
Sunstein’s conclusion that it is the most “fully entrenched.”278
The pronounced differences between the amendment procedures in Bulgaria and Hungary 
is a direct ramification of their post-Cold War contexts. In Bulgaria, the post-communist elites 
had wrested control earlier and more effectively than in Hungary, such that they were trying to 
protect the democratic institutions and principles they had already fought hard to inculcate in 
their country.  The Founders of Bulgaria had the most to gain by purporting to be the “fathers 279
of a liberal political order” and the most to lose if their new constitution “permit[ted the] 
confiscation of ill-gotten gains and the prosecution for crimes committed under the old 
system.”   While leaders of the Bulgarian revolution—like the 1st President Zhelyu Zhelev280 281
—were confident in the gains they had made so far, they feared they could lose all of their 
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progress in the first election of 1992.  In this context, it is unsurprising that Zhelyu Zhelev and 282
his supporters tried to enshrine within their constitution permanent democratic values and an 
inflexible amendment process.  283
Differently, the post-Soviet political landscape of Hungary was marked by a dearth of 
leadership. Hungary had a myriad of populist, centre-right, and liberal parties vying for control, 
with no clear leader. As a result, these parties negotiated a constitutional amendment process that 
would enable future change once they had seized control.  284
To return to the analysis of these amendment procedures, based on the arguments 
expressed in the prior chapters, there are a few normative claims that can be made about 
Hungary and Bulgaria’s procedures and their predicted effects on constitutional stability. 
Interestingly, these claims can then be tested against the amendments that have been passed since 
these countries were founded, teasing out the ways in which the differences in these mechanisms 
has led to or prevented democratic backsliding. 
Based on Bulgaria’s amendment formula, it would be assumed that they would have a 
relatively low to moderate amendment rate. As has been shown, when the amendment rate is too 
low, it can lead to problems like an over-reliance on the judiciary. However, Bulgaria had no 
functioning judiciary when it was first created, so it would appear that Bulgaria would likely 
either work to strengthen its constitutional court via amendment, or would have to use its 
arduous amendment process regularly to promote amendatory change. If neither of these things 
occurred, and there was still a high-level of demand for constitutional adaptation, Bulgaria would 
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have a populace that views its constitutional institutions with contempt. At the same time, 
Bulgaria’s arduous amendment procedure leads to the promotion of an amendment culture that is 
less supportive of amendatory change than that of Hungary’s. It would follow that by now, 
Bulgaria would have amended its constitution less than Hungary, or at least in less dramatic 
ways. 
In contrast, the relative ease of Hungary’s amendment procedure, and as well as its 
reliance on the legislature as the sole arbiter of amendatory change, would lead to a higher 
amendment rate than in Bulgaria, as well as a culture more prone to amendment as a solution to 
constitutional disagreement. The ‘supply’ of amendatory change would be greater in Hungary, 
but the demand—the changing circumstances that necessitate amendment—would be the same in 
both countries due to their similar history, geography, and political culture. As a result, it would 
seem normatively that the legislature of Hungary may become addicted to constitutional 
amendment, and so too could its citizens. If this were to occur, Hungary would eventually begin 
to pass amendments that undermine the democratic institutions that govern it. 
Consequently, the similarities between Hungary and Bulgaria, and the differences in their 
amendment procedures, allow them to be an effective case study to analyze the claims made in 
this thesis. The comparison of the amendments these countries have passed elucidates the effects 
of these amendments on constitutional stability, as well as the effects of these amendment 
processes on constitutional stability. 
Uniquely, Hungary continued to use its 1949 Constitution until 2010, drastically 
changing the document in 1990 as the country transitioned to democracy and capitalism.  285
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Interestingly, the much of the amendments passed at the beginning of Hungary’s democratic 
history were the type that Sunstein lauded. The nascent democrats of Hungary were changing 
and negotiating the ‘rules of the game.’ For example, in 1997, a popular amendment helped to 
develop and streamline the judicial system of the country, enabling Hungary to eventually join 
the EU.  The Hungarian people became trusting of their democratically-elected representatives 286
and comfortable with idea of amendatory change. At the same time, politicians began to see and 
understand their relatively lax amendment process, identifying that it was ripe for exploitation. 
The right-wing populist Viktor Orban, who had been pertinent in Hungarian political life since 
1988, was eventually elected as Prime Minister in a landslide in 2010.  Orban, whose coalition 287
had 263 of the 386 seats in the Hungarian Parliament, quickly went about creating a package of 
constitutional amendments that would amount to the new nation of Hungary’s first 
constitution.  Orban, who safely held a 2/3rds majority, filled this new constitution with 288
problematic provisions that undermined liberal values.  Learning from his successes, Orban did 289
not stop there. Orban, who has remained in power since 2010 and won re-election in 2018, has 
facilitated the passage of eight amendments in this ten year period, all of which have been 
criticized by international human rights groups and domestic NGOs.  290
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The quintessential example of Hungary’s parliament undermining democratic values and 
institutions via amendatory change came from the amendment package passed in 2013.  The 291
amendments were passed on a party line vote, with just Orban’s coalition voting in favour.  292
One of the most problematic amendments curtailed the powers of the constitutional court, one of 
the only institutions present in Hungary that was still defending liberal values from Orban.  293
The amendment—Articlce 37 (4) of the Hungarian Fundamental Law—prevented the Court 
from being able to refer to rulings made prior to 2010.  At the same time, the amendment 294
removed the ability of the court to substantively review amendments to the constitution.  In 295
turn, Hungary’s Constitutional Court could no longer attempt to protect the constitutional 
identity of the country, such that future amendments and laws were likely to undermine 
democratic procedures, goals, and institutions. The amendment package also gave preference to 
traditional relationships, specifying that marriage is between a man and women.  In regards to 296
freedom of speech, the amendments enabled the government to limit speech to prevent hate 
speech, and also restricted election campaign broadest to state media.  297
The amendments were a direct response to a series of the rulings by the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court. Orban had repeatedly tried to pass laws that were viewed as infringing 
upon the constitutional identity of Hungary, such as an amendment that allowed the parliament to 
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decide which religious organizations can be deemed churches.  The Court had done its job in 298
trying to protect liberal, democratic values, yet “instead of respecting those rulings, the 
government … reintroduced the same laws through amendments to the constitution itself and 
ended the court’s power to review substantive changes to the constitution.”  The laws related to 299
state media, and marriage had also been struck down by the Court. However, as a result of the 
facile amendment procedure in Hungary that Sunstein lauded, it was easier for Orban to pass 
these undemocratic laws as constitutional amendments rather than as ordinary legislation. At the 
same time, the amendment culture in Hungary was one that was supportive of amendatory 
change, but unlike New Zealand or other countries with ‘political barriers’ to complete 
constitutional revision, the citizens of Hungary had no constitutional or democratic history to 
serve as a guide with which to oppose such amendments. Similarly, the amendments in this 
context did not require a public referendum, so even if they were opposed by a majority of the 
public—Orban only won 43% of the vote in 2010—there was no opportunity for recourse.300
Interestingly, this amendment package was not the end, and Hungary went on to amend 
their constitution six more times since 2010.  All of these amendments have served to 301
substantively undermine institutions hostile to Orban.  In this context, it is unsurprising that 302
Hungary passed a law to give Orban dictatorial powers to suspend parliament and rule by decree 
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in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak.  With no judiciary to stand in its way, and no clauses 303
protecting constitutional identity, Orban has been able to destroy Hungary’s constitutional 
stability via formal amendment. As a result, Hungary is arguably no longer a democracy, but 
instead a functioning constitutional autocracy. Hungary is the poster-child for democratic 
backsliding, with its lax amendment procedure serving to exacerbate its problems. While it is 
clear democratic stability has been undermined completely in Hungary, it is less transparent that 
all of these problems are caused by their amending formula. It would be erroneous to claim 
Hungary is in the place it is in today solely because of amendatory change.
 However, the Hungarian example highlights how a problematic amendment procedure 
can exacerbate existing problems, allowing for political actors to use constitutional means to 
undermine democracy. While Bulgaria has experienced similar issues to Hungary—media 
capture, corruption, xenophobia and economic instability to name a few—its democracy has not 
collapsed to the same degree at least in part because of their amendment procedure and the 
protections it affords to democratic and liberal values. Similarly, the amendment procedure of 
Hungary created an amendment culture in that nation that was too supportive of amendment, too 
reliant on it as a means for political change. Hungary’s amendment process was easy and 
regularly used at the country’s founding, prompting a constitutional understanding on the part of 
the populace that amendatory change was normatively positive. With an easy amendment 
process, and an amendment culture overly-supportive of constitutional change, there wasn’t the 
level of public opposition necessary to prevent Orban’s amendments from coming to fruition. 
Differently, due to its constitution having no unamendable provisions, the Hungarian 
Judiciary was unable to prevent the passage of ‘unconstitutional’ constitutional amendments. 
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Had there been any eternity clauses included in Hungary’s constitution, it is possible that the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court would have had the jurisprudential clout to prevent some of 
Orban’s more egregious amendments on the basis that they were unconstitutional—as has been 
seen in Germany and Columbia. Consequently, the dearth in unamendability in the Hungarian 
constitution is just another feature of its amendment procedure that resulted in constitutional 
stability being undermined. 
Similarly, Bulgaria, like most Eastern European countries, has experienced democratic 
backsliding over the past decades. For example, in 2019, Bulgaria was ranked 111th out of 180 
countries in media freedom by Reporters without Borders.  This is the lowest score of any 304
country in Europe, excluding Belarus and Russia.  While media freedom is just one metric, it 305
reflects how Bulgaria has experienced some level of democratic backsliding. At the same time, 
the Bulgarian government has been active in trying to stifle what it views as problematic liberal 
values. For example, the Deputy Prime Minister Krasimir Karakachanov called for a ban on the 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC), the largest human rights organization in Bulgaria.  306
Karakachanov accused the BHC of “exerting direct and indirect pressure on Bulgarian 
magistrates and conducting anti-constitutional, illegal, immoral, and openly anti-Bulgarian 
activities.”  However, the Bulgarian government has been unable to amend the constitution in 307
the way Orban has, even though there is a similar level of disregard for democratic values. The 
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reason why this is the case is clear—Bulgaria has an amendment procedure that more effectively 
promotes constitutional stability. 
Bulgaria not only has a lower amendment rate than Hungary—it has amended the 
constitution four times—but its amendments are also different in substance. All three of the 
amendment packages passed in Bulgaria strengthened the role of the judiciary and promoted the 
democratic goals of the Bulgarian Constitution.  For example, the most recent amendment, 308
passed in 2015, amended the Supreme Judicial Council such that it was divided into two separate 
parts, one that oversees justices, and one that manages prosecutors and investigators.  This 309
amendment also strengthened the powers of the Judicial Council’s inspectorate, which 
investigates the activities of the country’s judicial bodies to prevent corruption.  Just as 310
Hungary was hamstringing their justice system, Bulgaria was strengthening theirs. As Bulgaria 
had the most stringent amendment formula, any amendment required large cross-party support. 
As a result, the amendments are technocratic, practical, and promote the end of constitutional 
stability. While one could attribute this to enlightened Bulgarian politicians, it is much more a 
ramification of the procedural constraints of the amendment process. As has been shown, 
political actors in Bulgaria can be just as problematic as those in Hungary. 
At the same time, the Bulgarian amendment procedure has inculcated an amendment 
culture beneficial to constitutional stability. Legislative and public debate about constitutional 
amendments in Bulgaria is centred on its benefits to the constitutional order, rather than political 
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motivations. The more arduous amendment process showed Bulgaria’s citizens that amendatory 
change is not a solution to everything, and when it must occur it is for consequential, stability-
promoting reasons. This is in direct contrast with Hungarian’s populace, who, as a result of 
Orban’s use of the constitution’s undemanding amendment procedure to promote political 
change, view constitutional and legal matters as virtually the same. In this context, it is 
unsurprising that Bulgarian’s are sceptical of amendatory change unless necessary, while 
Hungarians turn to amendment first. 
Another pertinent feature of Bulgaria’s constitution is its two track amendment 
procedure. Changes to the key constitutional provisions outlined in Article 158 require a more 
onerous amendment procedure than ‘normal’ amendments do. Article 158 covers everything 
from the amendment procedure itself to human rights, and amendments to it require the 
establishment of a separate, ‘Grand National Assembly’.  The Grand National Assembly is a 311
separate, elected body with 400 representatives, rather than the usual 240 members of the 
Bulgarian National Assembly.  This separate body must then vote on these amendments with a 312
2/3rds majority, in three readings, on three separate days.  However, this Grand National 313
Assembly has never been used. Instead, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court has ruled multiple 
times—Decisions No.3 2003, No. 3 2004, and No.5 2005—on which track amendments must go 
through to be passed.  314
Effectively, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court rules whether an amendment needs to be 
passed via the arduous, never-used process, or the more facile one. As a result, the Bulgarian 
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Constitutional Court has the jurisprudential clout to rule on the nature of amendments, and if 
some undermine the constitutional order, the Court is within its right to rule that the Grand 
National Assembly must be used. As the Grand National Assembly procedure has never been 
used, this type of ruling effectively invalidates an amendment. When the Court has this role in 
amendatory change, it ensures amendments won’t substantively undermine this democratic 
institution. In turn, it is unsurprising that Bulgaria’s amendments have strengthened its 
Constitutional Court while Hungary’s has undermined theirs. As the number of constitutional 
institutions that play a role in the amendment process grows, the better this process is at 
protecting the balance of power. This is just another manner in which Bulgaria’s amendment 
procedure promotes constitutional stability more effectively than Hungary’s. 
Consequently, Sunstein’s normative claims about the superiority of lax amendment 
procedures in Eastern Europe have been proven wrong if their superiority was based in their 
promotion of a functioning democracy. Amendment procedures are a means for constitutional 
change, and cannot receive complete responsibility for the actions of Orban, Hungary’s 
government, or Bulgaria’s. However, the fact these countries have such similar histories, 
governmental structures, geography, culture, and economies reflects the extent to which the 
amendment formulas have at least played some role in promoting or undermining the 
constitutional stability seen in these nations today. Bulgaria isn’t perfect and its democracy isn’t 
stable. However, Bulgaria’s amendment procedure promoted constitutional stability while 
Hungary’s undermined it. 
In the 2010-2020 period, Hungary passed eight constitutional amendments, resulting in 
the relatively high amendment rate of 0.8.  In contrast, Bulgaria passed one amendment in that 315
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same period, resulting in the low amendment rate of 0.1.  Both countries experience the 316
challenges associated with too high or too low a rate of amendment. Hungary’s citizens don’t 
view their constitution as higher law, and are instead comfortable with Orban gaining the power 
of a dictator. Differently, the citizens of Bulgaria are likely sceptical of their constitutional order, 
as the judiciary regularly has to step in to meet the amendatory demand that the constitution 
cannot. The amendment culture of Hungary is one prone to, and in favour of amendment, while 
Bulgaria’s amendment culture provides further insulation to its constitution, preventing 
problematic amendatory change. Bulgaria has issues in regards to its constitutional stability, but 
its amendment procedure, and the amendment culture it created, have promoted this end. In 
contrast, Hungary’s has done the opposite. 
The unique constitutional history of Eastern Europe, and the developments seen in 
Hungary and Bulgaria, help to support the claims made throughout this thesis about the effects of 
amendment processes on constitutional stability. There is no one-size-fits-all answer as to how an 
amendment procedure should function, but the arguments made in this chapter help to illustrate 
the importance of these mechanisms. Amendment procedures should not serve as a constitutional 
after-thought, and any constitutional or political scholar must take into account their effect on the 
systems they govern. 
 Evgeni Tanchev and Martin Belov, (2019): pg 1120316
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Section 3: The Theory of Amendatory Change
Consequently, amendment procedures have a clear observable effect on constitutional 
stability. When crafting a constitution, the amendment procedure should be tailored to promote 
this end. As was revealed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are some empirical and normative ways to 
promote constitutional stability through an amendment process. Primarily, unamendable 
provisions promote constitutional stability by ensuring some parts of the constitution are never 
changed. Equally, unamendable provisions empower constitutional courts to play a role in the 
amendment process, ruling on the constitutionality of amendments.  These eternity clauses also 
have a direct effect on a country’s amendment culture, influencing what ‘type’ of amendments 
the populace is comfortable with. In these three ways, unamendable provisions have a 
pronounced effect on the substance of amendments such that the amendments are more likely to 
promote constitutional stability. At the same time, unamendable provisions moderate the rate of 
amendment, ensuring there is not too much of it. Unamendable provisions also enable another 
institution, the judiciary, to play a role in amendment. As was seen in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
many other countries, unamendability promotes constitutional stability by enabling more 
institutions to play a role in amendatory change, further insulating the constitutional balance of 
power. While some of the other amendatory mechanisms cannot be applied universally, 
unamendable provisions are beneficial to any constitution that has the goal of permanence. 
Differently, amendment processes should not include the opportunity for a public 
referendum. Public referendums have an effect on both the process and substance of amendment. 
Constitutional matters regularly warrant nuance, and referendums necessitate politically 
palatable, easy-to-understand arguments. As a result, referendums are structurally in tension with 
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the goal of promoting constitutional stability. Referendums disempower courts from playing a 
role in the amendment process, and often actually serve to undermine that institution. When an 
amendment has the clout of being democratically supported by the majority of the nation, no 
matter how problematic the content is constitutionally, a court would be hard-pressed to rule 
against it. At the same time, referendums mute the substance of amendments, as citizens rarely 
truly comprehend the changes they are supporting. Referendums also have an effect on 
amendment culture, inculcating an understanding on the part of the populace that consequential 
political—rather than constitutional—matters should be put to amendment. When there is no 
delineation between constitutional matters and regular lawmaking, constitutional stability is 
undermined. For a constitution to function, it must be viewed by the populace as higher law. 
Referendums turn amendatory change into just another regular electoral process.
In these ways amendment processes effectively promote constitutional stability when 
they have unamendable provisions, and no opportunity for referendum. While these procedures 
can be applied to almost any constitution, other ‘moderating’ mechanisms should be chosen on a 
context-specific basis. As was seen in Eastern Europe, these countries that had little democratic 
history required a more restrictive amendment procedure to ensure that their new constitutional 
values were protected. In contrast, a country with a rich democratic history like America requires 
a more facile process to promote constitutional stability. As was shown in this chapter, there are 
many mechanisms that reduce or increase the difficulty associated with the passage of 
amendment. When crafting a constitution, framers should take into account their country’s 
unique history and use the procedural tools at their disposal to involve institutions and allow for 
a level of difficulty that promotes a beneficial amendment culture. 
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To summarize this ‘theory of amendatory change’, amendments are introduced and 
passed as a result of the amendment process that governs them. When scholars attempt to 
analyze constitutional developments, it is first fundamental to understand a country’s amendment 
procedure and its effects. The ways in which amendment processes influence the passage and 
substance of amendments can be distilled into four mechanisms—the institutions involved, the 
level of difficulty associated, unamendable provisions, and the amendment culture these factors 
create. The more constitutional institutions there are involved in an amendment process, the 
better protected the balance of power is. In turn, involving more institutions promotes 
constitutional stability. Differently, the level of difficulty influences a nation’s rate of amendment 
and the substance of those amendments. While every nation is different, this process cannot be 
too challenging or too easy,  as constitutional stability is undermined. As was explained in 
Chapters 2 and 3, unamendable provisions protect the most fundamental parts of a constitution 
and allow the judiciary to play a potent role in the formulation of amendment, promoting 
constitutional stability in a pertinent way. Finally, all of these factors influence a nation’s 
amendment culture, and the amendment process must be carefully tailored to promote an 
amendment culture supportive of constitutional stability. 
To further cement the conclusions made throughout this chapter, it is beneficial to apply 
this theory of amendatory change to America’s constitutional history. Interestingly, when 
America is analyzed through the lens of these four factors—the institutions involved, the level of 
difficulty, unamendability, and amendment culture—it appears that its amendment procedure 
undermines constitutional stability. As a result, some of the political problems witnessed in 
America today are at least in part a ramification of the amendment procedure that governs its 
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constitution. The applicability of the normative claims of this theory are even more transparent 
when they are tested against America’s historical developments. 
From an institutional standpoint, America’s amendment procedure is somewhat unique, 
with its emphasis on the state legislatures. For an amendment to be proposed, it must either go 
through one of two avenues—2/3rds of the Federal legislature must vote to send it for 
ratification, or the Congress, at the request of 2/3rds of the states, can call a ‘national 
constitutional convention.’  As the national convention process has never been used, the federal 317
legislature essentially holds control over the subject matter of amendments in America. However, 
because the federal legislature does not have the power to ratify these amendments, it means that 
this institution is unable to use amendatory change to empower itself, something that promotes 
constitutional stability. However, due to the fact that the state legislatures hold complete control 
over ratification, the subject matter of amendments and the number of amendments are 
diminished. 
When two institutions with such disparate interests control both sides of the amendment 
process—proposal and ratification—it means that this process will be rarely used. An 
amendment would have to be so palatable, uncontroversial, and transparently beneficial to be 
passed, as otherwise these institutions would not propose or ratify this amendment in pursuit of 
their own interests. Practically, state governments hold a veto power over amendment, and 
therefore the substance of amendments will tend to be tailored towards their interests. This 
normative understanding is supported by the history of amendment in America. For example, the 
1978 District of Columbia Voting Rights amendment was proposed and passed by the federal 
legislature, but still required ratification by the states. However, only 16 states ratified the 
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proposal.  As bipartisan state legislatures supported the amendment, the amendment’s eventual 318
failure is not reflective of a partisan calculation, but instead reveals how these state legislatures 
pursued their own institutional interests. The addition of another state to America would 
seemingly disempower every senator by a small margin and limit the amount of support the 
federal government provides to every other state. As a result, it unsurprising that this amendment 
was not ratified, as the state legislatures hold control over the process. Consequently, the 
institutional make-up of America’s amendment process has a notable effect, that amendments 
cannot infringe upon the powers of the states or they will not be passed at all. At the same time, 
based on the institutions involved and the devolution of amendatory powers, America is not 
likely to use its amendment process, as it is extremely arduous independent of super-majoritarian 
constraints. 
It is important to note that this is no way meant to question the original motivations of the  
Framers in crafting the amendment process. America’s founders had no history to base their 
amendment procedure on, and tried to craft one that would protect deliberation, consent of the 
governed, and the principles of federalism. As a result, the American amendment procedure is 
somewhat effective in pursuit of these goals. However, if the amendment procedure were to be 
redesigned today in pursuit of the goal of constitutional stability, its current institutional make-up 
would be a detrimental structure. 
Independent of the challenges associated with the institutions involved in Article V, this 
procedure also has strict super-majoritarian requirements. While this type of restraint is found in 
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many constitutions, only America’s has this interesting combination of supermajorities in the 
federal legislature and the states. When coupled with the difficulties of countervailing institutions 
controlling the process, the Article V procedure appears to be one of the most arduous in use 
today. As a result of this level of difficulty, America has a low rate of amendment and all of the 
issues associated. Countries with an extremely challenging amendment process are unable to 
meet the demand for amendatory change formally, and other institutions have to step in to 
facilitate constitutional development. Usually, this means that the judiciary regularly makes 
consequential rulings as to the constitutionality of certain concepts that otherwise would be 
settled via formal amendment. When this occurs, citizens are alienated from their constitution 
and the deliberative process associated with formal amendment. If the judiciary does this 
repeatedly, it undermines constitutional stability, as the whole order is called into question and 
the constitutional court is viewed with contempt. 
These normative observations are once again confirmed by the history of America. 
America has one of the most active judiciaries in the world, but unlike the Constitutional Court 
of Germany for example, they have minimal amendatory basis for these rulings—the decisions 
are usually based on constitutional construction rather than a novel addition to the constitution. 
At the same time, public perception of America’s judiciary has been deteriorating over time. For 
a constitutional system to remain intact, the institutions it creates must be functioning and 
respected. When the judiciary regularly has to step in as the final constitutional arbiter with no 
formal amendatory basis, they are viewed as an undemocratic, unelected institution by the 
populace. In these ways, the level of difficulty associated with America’s amendment process not 
only diminishes the amount of formal amendment, but also the constitutional stability of the 
system overall. In this context, it is unsurprising that the scholars identified in Chapter 1 are 
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unable to truly ‘count’ the number of amendments to the American constitution. If the goal is to 
promote constitutional stability, this obfuscation is problematic and amendatory change should 
go through the formal process. 
While America has one of the most arduous amendment processes, it has virtually no 
unamendable provisions. As was explained in Chapter 2, there is only the senate apportionment 
clause, which places an unnecessary emphasis on the role of the states. As a result, there is no 
part of the American constitution that can be identified as its constitutional identity—while some 
may point to the Preamble, or the Bill of Rights, these provisions have not functioned as 
unamendable underlying constitutional principles. As a result, Americans view their entire 
constitution with reverence, rather than a certain portion. The entire American constitution is 
‘over-valued’ and improvements to it are ‘under-valued’. At the same time, the Supreme Court 
has no jurisprudential basis to invalidate unconstitutional amendments. While the difficulty of 
the process has prevented the Supreme Court from having to rule in this manner, future political 
actors could use amendment as an avenue for unconstitutional, problematic change, and 
unamendable provisions would help to prevent that from happening.  
In these ways, America’s constitutional system would be better insulated if there were 
eternity clauses empowering the Court to rule on the constitutionality of amendment. For 
example, the 18th amendment—the prohibition of alcohol—was reflective of a ‘momentary 
passion' on the part of the American populace and was repealed by the 21st amendment a decade 
later. If there were unamendable provisions within the American Constitution protecting basic 
rights or principles of freedom, the Supreme Court would have had the jurisprudential basis to 
invalidate such an amendment. While it is impossible to say if the Court would have actually 
done so, at the least, the history of the 18th amendment reflects an opportunity for the court to 
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have exercised this power. In the future, there may be an amendment that destroys America’s 
constitutional order. However, the final protection against such an amendment, unamendable 
provisions, are not a part of the Article V process. This reality is a serious threat to constitutional 
stability. 
Finally, all three of these amendatory mechanisms inform the fourth factor, amendment 
culture. The level of difficulty associated with the amendment process, as well as the institutions 
involved, create an amendment culture that is extremely reluctant to use formal amendment as 
the means for constitutional change. This is reflected in the scholarly arguments against 
amendment presented in Chapter 1—American citizens feel amendatory change is superfluous 
and unnecessary. However, as has been shown in Chapters 2 and 3, formal amendment is 
necessary to promote constitutional stability. As a result, the amendment culture in America 
undermines the constitutional order, as necessary constitutional developments do not go through 
the formal process. This problematic culture is further exacerbated by the effect of 
unamendability on American’s constitutional understanding. As no specific provisions within the 
American Constitution reflect its constitutional identity, citizens view the entire document with 
reverence and are against changing it in any way. In turn, America’s amendment culture serves as 
the last, most consequential barrier to amendment. If the citizens of America view formal 
amendment as detrimental, they will never use it as an avenue for change. As a result, it is 
unsurprising that America has one of the least amended constitutions in the world today. 
Consequently, based on this theory’s four factors, it normatively follows that America’s 
amendment procedure undermines its constitutional stability. America has had one of the longest 
lasting, least-amended constitutional orders, but the threats to stability it is experiencing today 
may be a ramification of its amendment procedure. When constitutional questions are settled by 
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judicial decision rather than formal amendment, they lack finality and permanence. As a result, 
America’s Overton window—the range of policies acceptable to the mainstream population—has 
been stretched too far. A large swath of the population cannot be operating under the assumption 
that Roe V Wade is unconstitutional, while another portion of the population thinks the opposite. 
When citizens have such disparate understandings of what their constitution protects, the 
constitutional order is threatened as stability requires a common comprehension of constitutional 
principles. 
At the same time, America has had to rely on its judiciary for constitutional upkeep. 
While this has worked in the short time since FDR’s presidency, it has resulted in a politicization 
of, and over-reliance on, the judiciary. In turn, citizens have come to view the Supreme Court 
with contempt, especially when they don’t agree with the Court’s ruling. This is a serious 
problem for constitutional stability, as institutions must be respected and Court’s rulings 
followed. Moreover, American’s lack a unifying constitutional identity outlined by an eternity 
clause. Without it, not only does the judiciary lack the ability to rule on the constitutionality of 
amendments, but it also further swells the Overton window, as no-one truly knows America’s 
most formative constitutional provisions. Some may claim it is the 2nd Amendment, while others 
may claim its Article I. Ultimately, if America had an amendment process more finely attuned to 
the goal of constitutional stability, taking into account these four factors in its creation, the 
procedure may have served to promote, rather than undermine, constitutional stability. However, 
it seems America’s current political divides have been exacerbated by its amendment process. 
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Conclusion:
This thesis has sought to bring amendment processes to the forefront of constitutional 
discussion, highlighting the fundamental ways in which these procedures influence a nation’s 
constitutional development. Amendment procedures not only facilitate the passage of 
amendments, but they also inform the substance of amendments. At the same time, the 
amendment procedure has a direct effect on what amendments are not passed. In turn, 
amendment procedures have a strong relationship with constitutional stability, and can work to 
promote or undermine it. When trying to understand why a certain constitutional system has 
succeeded or failed, scholars must first take into account the amendment process’ role in these 
developments. Moreover, when trying to comprehend why some amendments receive support 
and others do not, the emphasis must once again be placed on the procedure’s effect in this 
context. The permanence of a constitutional order is influenced by countless factors, many out of 
citizens control. However, one of the most consequential factors, amendment procedure, has 
been misunderstood. While many consider them unimportant, in actuality, amendment processes 
have one of the most pronounced effects on constitutional stability, and should be viewed with 
respect as a result. Amendment procedures, by governing what can change within a constitution, 
are the most pertinent piece of the constitutional puzzle. 
Moreover, when analyzing amendment procedures and their effects, this thesis’ theory of 
amendatory change should be applied. By looking at the four mechanisms through which 
amendment procedures influences the number and substance of amendments—the institutions 
involved, the level of difficulty, unamendability, and amendment culture—important normative 
conclusions can be drawn as to the functioning of a constitutional order. This is reflected by 
Chapter 3’s analysis of Bulgaria, Hungary, and America. While all constitutional developments 
 115
are not directly caused by the amendment procedure, the amendment procedures informs the 
substance of any constitutional change. By viewing constitutional systems through this lens, the 
effects of amendment procedure on constitutional stability can be properly understood. 
Ultimately, countless factors affect constitutional stability and amendment procedure is 
just one of them. However, amendment procedures have a powerful effect, and unlike other 
constitutional factors, they are regularly forgotten. By placing procedure in the centre of the 
discussion, this thesis hopes to help politicians, scholars, and citizens alike better understand 
their constitutional systems. To address the threats modern democracies face, citizens must 
understand where these threats come from. Sometimes, the threat is not external or caused by a 
political actor, but it is instead the amendment procedure itself. When people fail to comprehend 
this reality, they blame the ills of their amendment procedure on democratic government. In turn, 
constitutional stability is undermined in the ways seen in America today. To ensure the 
permanence of democratic constitutional orders across the world, citizens must understand that 
sometimes, “it’s the procedure, stupid!”  319
 If it was unclear, this is a reference to James Carville’s famous phrase from the 1992 Election season. https://319
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_the_economy,_stupid
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